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Abstract
The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmstro¨m
(1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately
knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later
on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a sequential menu of del-
egation sets where the agent first picks a delegation set and then chooses an action
within this set. For the uniform–quadratic case, we characterize when sequential
delegation is strictly better than static delegation and derive the optimal delega-
tion menu. We provide sufficient conditions so that our results extend beyond the
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1 Introduction
In many important settings, uninformed decision makers rely on informed, but biased
experts, and, moreover, the exchange of monetary transfers is impossible. When mak-
ing strategic business decisions, firm headquarters depend on the superior knowledge of
division managers who care for their own division more than for the firm as a whole. In-
dustry regulators seek to base their decisions on privately known firm characteristics, but
instead of the firm’s profits, want to maximize social welfare. Financial advisors have bet-
ter information than investors but are often remunerated based on commissions, biasing
them towards recommending certain funds. Other examples include politician-lobbyist,
patient-doctor, or client-advocate relationships.
Holmstro¨m’s (1977, 1984) seminal delegation principle implies that an optimal mech-
anism for the principal in such an environment amounts to delegating decision making to
the expert by offering him a set of permissible decisions from which he can freely choose.
While more discretion allows the expert to better adapt the decision to his information,
the key reason to limit discretion is to constrain the expert in pursuing his partisan ob-
jectives. In many natural settings, optimal delegation takes a remarkably simple form,
known as “interval delegation”: the expert’s discretion is only constrained from below
and/or above. The desire to limit the expert’s discretion can thus provide a rationale for
institutions such as price or budget caps, tariff regulations, or minimum wages.
Our point of departure in this paper is the observation that in many situations the
relationship between a principal and an expert is dynamic: instead of being perfectly
informed at the beginning, the expert obtains relevant information often only during the
course of the relationship. A central problem for the principal in such a situation is
that at the outset she does not know whether the information the expert will obtain is
actually useful for her needs. For example, in a relationship between headquarters and a
country division, the division has better information about local demand conditions, like
demographics or heterogeneity of consumers. However, when introducing a new product,
the country division might a priori not know how the product will be perceived, but will
only gradually learn whether the product is suitable for the local consumers.
In such a dynamic situation, how should the principal structure the decision making
process to arrive at an optimal decision? This is the question we address in this paper.
To study this question, we extend Holmstro¨m’s delegation principle and show that, in
our dynamic environment, any mechanism can be implemented by a menu of delegation
sets where, initially, the expert chooses a delegation set from the menu, and then, after
having obtained new information, he makes a decision within the initially chosen set.
The contribution of the paper is to provide a characterization of the optimal menu of
delegation sets for the familiar setting with quadratic utility and constant bias where we
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assume that the expert is biased towards higher decisions.1 Unlike in the standard setting,
the expert privately observes an imperfect signal about the state during the course of the
relation, but at the outset has private information about the precision of the signal he
will receive. We interpret the signal’s precision as the expert’s ability and consider the
simplest case with two possible expert types: a “good” expert and a “bad” expert.
The good expert receives a more precise signal. This means, his posterior beliefs
conditional on his signal will be more dispersed (i.e., better match the true distribution)
from an ex ante perspective. Hence, if the expert’s ability is publicly known, the good
expert is granted more discretion since in this way he can better adapt the decision to
the more dispersed beliefs. In fact, in our setting, the good expert is simply offered a
larger interval of decisions. The key novel issue that arises when the expert’s ability
is his private information, is whether the principal can and wants to offer a menu of
delegation sets to screen the expert’s ability. Clearly, simply offering the menu that
consists of the delegation sets from the public information case is not feasible, because a
bad expert would always pretend to be a good expert so as to enjoy the good expert’s
larger discretion.
Effectively, when the principal screens the expert’s ability, she sequentially delegates
decision making: in the first stage, the expert chooses a delegation set, and in the second
stage, he chooses an action from the set. Sequential delegation is feasible only if the
menu of delegation sets is incentive compatible so that each expert type has an incentive
to select the delegation set which corresponds to his true ability. A key insight of our
analysis is that screening the expert’s ability through sequential delegation is feasible
even though, absent contingent monetary transfers, the number of screening instruments
available to the principal is quite limited.2 In fact, the only instrument available to the
principal is the degree of discretion granted to the agent. In order to prevent the bad
expert from pretending to be a good one, the principal needs to impose a “cost” on the
good expert by excluding some of the decisions from his delegation set. In particular, we
show that the optimal way to screen the expert’s ability is to offer the good expert a set
of extreme decisions and to bar him from making moderate decisions. At the same time,
the bad expert is offered an interval of more moderate decisions much like in the case
with publicly known abilities.
Intuitively, such a menu is incentive compatible because the bad expert, knowing
he receives less precise final information, anticipates that he will likely favor moderate
decisions after having observed the signal. Therefore, the bad expert refrains from taking
a delegation set that offers only extreme yet no moderate decisions. Reversely, the good
1While our main analysis is conducted for the case with a uniformly distributed state, we also provide
sufficient conditions so that our results hold for other than uniform distributions.
2It is well–known that sequential screening is feasible when contingent monetary transfers are avail-
able. See, e.g., Courty and Li (2000).
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expert, who anticipates to hold more dispersed beliefs, considers it less likely that his
optimal decisions are moderate. Therefore, the good expert prefers a delegation set with
extreme decisions to one with moderate decisions.
While this makes clear that sequential delegation is feasible, the key question is
whether it is actually optimal to engage in sequential delegation. Instead, the princi-
pal can engage in static delegation by offering the degenerate menu that consists of a
single delegation set only. For the case with a uniformly distributed state, we fully de-
scribe when sequential delegation is strictly better than static delegation: First, if the
difference between the good and bad expert’s ability is sufficiently small compared to
the expert’s bias, then static delegation is optimal. Second, for sufficiently large ability
difference (relative to the bias), sequential delegation becomes optimal. Third, if the abil-
ity difference is in an intermediate range, static delegation is optimal whenever the high
type is sufficiently likely. Moreover, we show that whenever static delegation is optimal,
optimal delegation takes the simple form of interval delegation.3
To provide intuition for these results, it is useful to consider the benchmark case in
which the expert’s ability is publicly known. The design of an optimal delegation set is
then determined by the trade–off between utilizing the expert’s information (information
effect) and giving up control (loss-of-control effect). The loss-of-control effect makes the
principal averse to delegate large decisions, because the expert prefers, from the principal’s
perspective, excessively large decisions. Thus the larger the conflict of interest (i.e., the
bias), the smaller the decisions the principal delegates. Moreover, as indicated earlier, as
the information effect is stronger for the good expert, the principal would offer a larger
delegation set to the good expert in the benchmark case.
For the case that the agent’s ability is his private information, we first derive the
optimal static delegation set. We obtain the intuitive result that, compared to the case
with publicly observable ability, under the optimal static delegation set too many decisions
are delegated to the bad and too few to the good expert type. Relative to static delegation,
sequential delegation involves the following trade-off: On the one hand, offering extreme
decisions to the good expert better utilizes this type’s superior information, because due
to his more dispersed beliefs, the optimal decision is more likely to be an extreme one. On
the other hand, disallowing moderate decisions is also costly if the signal indicates that a
moderate decision should be taken. The three cases identified earlier determine when the
benefits outweigh the costs of sequential delegation in the uniform case. For more general
distributions, we establish sufficient conditions for the optimal sequential delegation menu
to have qualitatively the same shape as in the uniform case. The condition guarantees
that precluding moderate options from a delegation set hurts the bad expert more than
3We also show, however, that when static delegation is suboptimal, the optimal static delegation set
may not be an interval.
4
the principal, if the latter believes to face the good expert. We also show that in this
case there are always parameters so that sequential delegation is in fact optimal.
From an applied perspective, our results show both the robustness and the limits
of the optimality of interval delegation in a dynamic setting. When static delegation
is optimal, interval delegation survives as the optimal mechanism. This confirms the
importance of simple delegation mechanisms in the form of caps or tariffs. On the other
hand, our results also provide a justification for why the discretion of experts may be
limited in more complex ways. For example, headquarters of multinational firms may
delegate the restructuring of local business operations to national managers leaving them
a choice between either cutting costs across all local activities or terminating a certain
number of activities of their choosing. The flavor of our result resonates in plea bargaining
procedures in the U.S. criminal law where the defendant, or the coalition between the
defendant and the prosecutor (the principal), can propose an agreement to the court (the
agent) in which the defendant pleads guilty and, if the court accepts the proposal, the
court commits to a set of relatively mild sentences. If the court rejects the proposal, the
court is free to implement extreme sentences instead. Our interpretation is that the court
accepts the agreement if the case is intransparent and the court knows to receive only
little conclusive evidence about the defendant’s guilt, and the court rejects the agreement
if it knows to obtain sufficient evidence to convict or acquit the defendant.
Related Literature
Our paper brings together two strands of the literature: the literature on optimal del-
egation and the literature on sequential screening. Starting with the seminal work of
Holmstro¨m (1977, 1984) the optimal delegation literature asks how a principal should
optimally delegate decision making to an informed, but biased agent. Alonso and Ma-
touscheck (2008) and Amador and Bagwell (2012a) provide conditions that characterize
the optimal delegation set in general environments, including characterizations for when
simple interval delegation is optimal.4 Our main contribution to this literature is that,
instead of a static environment with a fully informed agent, we consider a dynamic en-
vironment where the agent’s information arrives sequentially over time. In recent work,
Semenov (2012) considers a setup with an expert who may know the state either fully or
not at all. While this setup can be nested within our model (when the good expert fully
learns the state and the bad expert does not learn at all), it is ruled out by assumption in
our paper. Moreover, Semenov (2012) considers only static delegation and does not allow
for the agent’s expertise to be screened. In this sense, Semenov (2012) complements our
analysis of static delegation.
4See also Martimort and Semenov (2006). For an application of optimal delegation to international
trade agreements, see Amador and Bagwell (2012b).
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Our result that sequential delegation requires the principal offer delegation sets with
only extreme options is somewhat similar to the insight by Szalay (2005) that offering
extreme options is optimal to provide incentives for an initially uninformed agent to
endogenously acquire information. Instead of providing incentives for information acqui-
sition, in our setup offering only extreme options screens the agent’s ex ante expertise.
Moreover, Szalay (2005) considers an unbiased agent which in our setup would lead to
full delegation, without screening, to be optimal.
Our paper draws heavily on the insights in Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009) who provide
a handy and intuitive representation of the principal’s expected utility as a weighted
average of the agent’s utility. In particular, we exploit this representation to derive the
optimal static delegation set in our setup. This is not trivial since, for some parameters,
our setup violates the conditions for which Alonso and Matouscheck (2008) or Kova´cˇ and
Mylovanov (2009) characterize the solution to the static delegation problem.5
Secondly, our paper is related to the literature on sequential screening in the spirit of
Courty and Li (2000) who study a dynamic price discrimination problem where the agent,
while knowing a private signal at the time of contracting, learns his actual willingness
to pay at the time of consumption only over time.6 In terms of information structure
and timing, our setup is essentially the same as that in Courty and Li (2000). But, the
key difference is that we consider parties without transferable utility so that contingent
monetary transfers are not available. Courty and Li (2000) establish that under standard
regularity conditions the optimal contract always elicits the agent’s information sequen-
tially and strictly improves over the optimal static screening contract. In contrast, in our
setup both static and sequential delegation can be optimal, depending on parameters. In
this sense, the availability of money as a screening instruments works in favor of, but is
not necessary, for the optimality of sequential screening.7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup. Section 3 derives
the principal’s mechanism design problem, and Section 4 shows that the principal’s prob-
lem can be equivalently stated as a sequential delegation problem. Section 5 describes
the principal’s fundamental trade-off when designing delegation sets, and Section 6 char-
acterizes two benchmark cases: when the agent’s ability is publicly known and when
5The optimal delegation literature assumes that the principal can contractually constrain the agent’s
discretion, that is, decisions are contractible. A large literature studies the problem with non-contractible
decisions and asks how the unconstrained delegation of authority to an informed and biased agent com-
pares to other modes of organization, such as communication. See, for instance, Riordan and Sappington
(1987), Dessein (2002), Kra¨hmer (2006), Mylovanov (2008), Semenov (2008), Bester (2009), Goltsman,
Ho¨rner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) to name only a few.
6See also Baron and Besanko (1984), Battaglini (2005), Eso¨ and Szentes (2007a, 2007b), Dai, Lewis,
and Lopomo (2006), Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008, 2011), Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012), Inderst and
Hoffmann (2011), Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar (2011), Inderst and Peitz (2012).
7On a related note, Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2012) show that in the standard sequential screening model
with money, a sequential contract is never optimal if no ex post losses can be imposed on the agent.
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only static delegation is feasible. Section 7 fully describes the solution to the sequen-
tial delegation problem for the uniform distribution. Section 8 contains the extension to
non–uniform distributions of the state. Section 9 concludes. Proofs of all propositions
and lemmas are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
A principal (she) has to take a decision x ∈ R. Her payoff from the decision depends
on a state of the world given by the random variable θ˜. We assume θ˜ to be uniformly
distributed on the unit interval. (This assumption will be relaxed in Section 8.) The
principal does not know the true state and consults an agent (he) for advice. When the
principal approaches the agent, also the agent does not know the true state, but before
the decision is taken, he privately observes an imperfect signal s˜ about the true state.
In addition, the agent privately knows his degree of expertise or his forecasting ability
which is captured by the quality his signal. We assume that s˜ coincides with the true
state with probability p ∈ [0, 1], whereas it is pure noise with probability 1− p. By “pure
noise” we mean a random variable that is identically distributed as, but stochastically
independent from, the true state. The agent does not know whether the realization of
the signal is true or noise.8 Thus, p is a measure for the agent’s ability, and we refer to
p as the agent’s ability type. We assume that the type can be either “high” or “low”:
p ∈ {h, `}, where h > `. The probability with which the agent’s type is p is commonly
known by the parties and denoted by µp ∈ [0, 1].
The parties have state-dependent preferences and disagree about the ideal action to
be taken. We adopt the familiar quadratic utility representation: if action x is taken in
state θ, the principal’s utility is −(x−(θ−b))2, and the agent’s utility is −(x−θ)2, where
the “bias” b > 0 measures the conflict of interest between the parties.9,10 We assume in
the whole paper that
b ≤ `/2. (1)
This assumption reduces the number of case distinctions and is not substantial. It will
guarantee that when the agent’s ability is publicly known, the optimal delegation set is
a non-degenerate interval (see Lemma 4).11
8This signal structure is sometimes referred to as the “replacement noise” model.
9This setting is the leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982) and has also been extensively used in
the literature. See, for example, Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008), Dessein (2002), Blume, Board,
and Kawamura (2008), Goltsmann et al. (2010), Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007), Ottaviani and
Squintani (2006).
10The literature frequently ascribes the bias to the agent in the sense that the principal’s ideal action
is the state θ, and the agent’s ideal action is θ + b. As will become clear below, our formulation is more
convenient for our purposes.
11In the terminology of Alonso and Matouscheck (2008), assumption (1) means that delegation is
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At the outset, the principal can commit to a mechanism which specifies an action to
be taken after the agent has observed the signal. The principal’s objective is to design a
mechanism which maximizes her expected utility.
Before we describe the principal’s design problem in detail, we argue that in our setup
with quadratic preferences, the expected state conditional on the signal,
ω˜ ≡ E[θ˜ | s˜] = ps˜+ (1− p) · 1/2, (2)
is a sufficient statistics for the signal. In what follows, it will be more convenient to work
with this sufficient statistics. Observe that since the state is uniformly distributed, the
random variable ω˜ is uniformly distributed on the support [ωp, ω¯p], where the support
endpoints are given by
ωp = 1/2− p/2, ω¯p = 1/2 + p/2.
We denote by fp the density of ω˜ and Fp the corresponding cumulative distribution
function.
Since preferences are quadratic, a party’s expected utility, conditional on the signal,
is of the mean-variance form: for z ∈ {0, b},
E[−(x− (θ˜ − z))2 | s] = −(x− (ω − z))2 + V ar(θ˜ | s),
where V ar(θ˜ | s) is the conditional variance of the state, conditional on signal realization
s. Because the conditional variance enters utility only as a constant, a party’s marginal
utility from an action depends only on the expected state ω, yet not on s. We can thus
normalize utility by subtracting the variance. Therefore, our model is isomorphic to
the model where the agent first privately observes his ex ante type p and then privately
observes the expected state ω as specified in (2), and where the principal’s and the agent’s
utilities are respectively given by −(x− (ω − b))2, and −(x− ω)2.
The following timing summarizes the description of the model.12
0. The principal commits to a mechanism.
1. The agent privately observes his ability type p ∈ {h, `}.
2. The agent privately observes the expected state ω ∈ [ωp, ω¯p].
valuable when facing the low type. Complementary to our analysis, Semenov (2012) derives the optimal
static delegation set for the case that h = 1 and ` = 0 (where assumption (1) does not hold), but does
not consider sequential delegation.
12The timing implicitly assumes that the principal can clearly distinguish between periods 1 and 2.
This is natural in many applications and is also the standard assumption in sequential screening models
with money (see, for instance, Courty and Li (2000)).
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3. An action is implemented according to the terms of the mechanism.
The main question of the paper is to what extent the principal can exploit the fact that
the agent receives his information sequentially. In particular, we ask when the principal
can do strictly better by using a “sequential” mechanism, which conditions on the agent’s
ability type, than by using the optimal “static” mechanism, which does not condition on
ability type. To address this question, it is necessary to be able to solve for the optimal
“static” mechanism. As will become clear below, this is already demanding in our setup
with quadratic preferences, constant bias, and two ability types and is likely to be even
more so in more general environments. In the case with a uniformly distributed state,
we will fully characterize whether a sequential or a static mechanism is optimal in our
setup. In Section 8, we go beyond the uniform distribution and provide a set of sufficient
conditions so that the main insights of our analysis for the uniform case extend to more
general distributions.
3 The principal’s problem
The principal’s objective is to design a mechanism which maximizes her expected utility.
In this section, we describe the principal’s problem formally. Since the agent has private
information, the action implemented by the mechanism optimally depends on commu-
nication by the agent to the principal. By the revelation principle for sequential games
(Myerson, 1986), the optimal mechanism is in the class of direct and incentive compatible
mechanisms. A direct mechanism requires the agent to report his private information as
soon as it has arrived. Formally, a direct mechanism M is a pair (ξh, ξ`) of mappings with
ξpˆ : [ωpˆ, ω¯pˆ]→ R, pˆ ∈ {h, `}.
A direct mechanism requires the agent to first submit a report pˆ about his ability and
then a report ωˆ about the expected state and then implements the action ξpˆ(ωˆ).
13
If the agent’s ex post type is ω and his period 1 report was pˆ, then his utility from
reporting ωˆ in period 2 is −(ξpˆ(ωˆ)−ω)2. The mechanism is incentive compatible in period
2 if it gives the agent an incentive to report the expected state truthfully, conditional on
having reported his ability truthfully. That is, if for all p ∈ {h, `} and ω, ωˆ ∈ Ωp,
−(ξp(ω)− ω)2 ≥ −(ξp(ωˆ)− ω)2. (3)
13We restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. For an investigation of stochastic mechanisms in
the static delegation problem, see Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009).
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Observe that the revelation principle does not require truth-telling off the equilibrium
path, i.e., after a lie in period 1.14
Next, we turn to incentive compatibility in period 1. If the agent’s ability is p, the
expected state is uniformly distributed on [ωp, ω¯p]. Thus, the agent’s expected utility
from reporting pˆ when his true ability is p is∫ ω¯p
ωp
max
ωˆ
[−(ξpˆ(ωˆ)− ω)2] 1
p
dω.
Again, because truth-telling is not required after a lie in period 2, the agent may find it
optimal to lie again in period 2 after a lie in period 1. Thus the “max” operator under
the integral.
The mechanism is incentive compatible in period 1 if it gives the agent an incentive to
report his type truthfully in period 1. Observe that if the agent tells the truth in period
1, then second period incentive compatibility guarantees truth-telling in period 2. Hence,
the mechanism is incentive compatible in period 1 if for all p, pˆ,∫ ω¯p
ωp
−(ξp(ω)− ω)2 1
p
dω ≥
∫ ω¯p
ωp
max
ωˆ
−(ξpˆ(ωˆ)− ω)2 1
p
dω. (4)
The principal’s (conditional) expected utility under an incentive compatible mecha-
nism M when the agent’s ability is p is
Vp(M) ≡
∫ ω¯p
ωp
−(ξp(ω)− (ω − b))2 1
p
dω,
and her ex ante expected utility is V (M) ≡ µhVh(M)+µ`V`(M). The principal’s problem,
referred to as M, can therefore be stated as follows:
M : max
M
V (M) s.t. (3), (4).
4 Sequential Delegation
It is well-known that in the static analogue to our problem, when the agent knows the true
state at the outset, the principal’s problem can be equivalently stated as a “delegation
14The reason is that incentive compatibility in period 1 implies that a lie in period 1 is a zero probability
event and, thus, what happens afterwards does not affect the principal’s utility. On the other hand,
allowing for lying off the path may increase the set of implementable outcomes (see Myerson, 1986).
See also Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008) for an elaboration of this point in the context of a principal agent
problem with money.
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problem” where instead of requiring a report by the agent and implementing the action
herself, the principal offers the agent a set of actions from which he can freely choose.
In this section, we argue that also the mechanism design problem M can be equiv-
alently stated as a sequential delegation problem where the principal offers the agent a
menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets, and the agent chooses a delegation set from the menu
in period 1 and picks an action from the chosen delegation set in period 2.
To see that the problemM is equivalent to a sequential delegation problem, consider
a menu of delegation sets and observe that, if the agent has chosen Dpˆ in period 1, then
he chooses in period 2 the action15,16
xpˆ(ω) ∈ arg max
x′∈Dpˆ
−(x′ − ω)2. (A)
We call a menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets incentive compatible if the agent of any type
p ∈ {h, `} chooses the delegation set Dp from the menu, i.e., if
−
∫ ω¯p
ωp
(xp(ω)− ω)2 1
p
dω ≥ −
∫ ω¯p
ωp
(xpˆ(ω)− ω)2 1
p
dω for all pˆ ∈ {h, `}. (ICp)
We now argue that any outcome that can be implemented by a direct, incentive compati-
ble mechanism M can also be implemented by an incentive compatible menu of delegation
sets, and vice versa. Indeed, for an incentive compatible mechanism M , define the menu
of delegation sets by the set of all possible actions that can arise under the mechanism:
Dp = {ξp(ω) | ω ∈ [ωp, ω¯p]}, p ∈ {h, `}. Then it follows by (3) that the choice function
xp(ω) = ξp(ω) satisfies (A). Moreover, (4) implies that the menu (Dh, D`) is incen-
tive compatible and, thus, implements the same outcome as the direct mechanism M .
Reversely, given an incentive compatible menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets, define the
mechanism M by the choice function given in (A): ξp(ω) ≡ xp(ω). Then the mechanism
is (trivially) incentive compatible in period 2, and (ICp) implies that M is also incentive
compatible in period 1.
Therefore, we can state the principal’s problem M equivalently as the following se-
quential delegation problem:
D : max
(Dh,D`)
∑
p∈{h,`}
µp
∫ ω¯p
ωp
−(xp(ω)− (ω − b))2 1
p
dω s.t. (A), (IC`), (ICh).
15Without loss of generality, we may assume that delegation sets are closed and bounded. In that case
the arg max is well defined. See footnote 15 in Alonso and Matouscheck (2008).
16This is with slight abuse of notation. Strictly speaking, the agent’s optimal action is a function of
the delegation set.
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In general, the solution to D will not be unique.17 This is so because one can always
add redundant actions to the solution which in no state would be chosen by the agent.
We therefore restrict attention to minimal optimal delegation menus in the sense that
any action in the delegation set is chosen in some state and that unchosen actions are
removed.18,19
The minimal optimal delegation menu has the property that in the most extreme
states, the most extreme actions are chosen, and that there is at most one action outside
the support of the state. To state this formally, we introduce the following notation for
the minimal and maximal actions in a delegation set Dp which we shall use throughout
the paper:20
xp = minDp, x¯p = maxDp.
Lemma 1. Consider a minimal optimal delegation menu (Dh, D`) and let p ∈ {h, `}.
Then xp(ωp) = xp and xp(ω¯p) = x¯p. Moreover, each of the sets Dp ∩ (−∞, ωp) and
Dp ∩ (ω¯p,+∞) contains at most one action. If so, then it is the action xp and x¯p,
respectively.
The proof of the lemma is straightforward and is, thus, omitted.
5 Information and loss-of-control effect
In this section, we explain the fundamental trade-off the principal faces when designing
a delegation set, conditional on facing a given ability type, and capture this trade-off
formally.
At a fundamental level, granting the agent more discretion involves the trade-off of
making better use of the agent’s information versus suffering a loss of control. Take a
delegation set Dp and consider the effect of adding a single action x¯p + ε to Dp (where
ε > 0 is small). On the one hand, for states higher than x¯p + ε/2 + b, the agent’s decision
is now closer to the principal’s ideal decision (the information effect). On the other hand,
more freedom of action is costly, because for states in [x¯p + ε/2, x¯p + ε/2 + b], the agent’s
decision moves farther away from the principal’s ideal decision which equals state minus
bias (the loss-of-control effect).
17Analogously as in Holmstro¨m (1984), Theorem 1, it can be shown that a solution to the sequential
delegation problem D indeed exists.
18Alonso and Matouscheck (2008) proceed in the same fashion.
19Observe that removing these actions does not upset incentive compatibility. In fact, it relaxes
incentive compatibility, as removing actions from Dpˆ only reduces agent type p’s incentives to pick the
delegation set Dpˆ.
20Note that both the minimum and maximum exist, as Dp is closed and bounded.
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To capture the information and loss-of-control effect formally, we transform the prin-
cipal’s objective by exploiting the second period incentive compatibility constraint (A).
Let up(ω) = −(xp(ω)− ω)2 denote the agent’s utility in state ω when having picked Dp.
The constraint (A) pins down the agent’s utility and, in fact is equivalent, to21
up(ω2)− up(ω1) =
∫ ω2
ω1
2(xp(ω)− ω) dω for all ω1, ω2. (5)
Therefore, under an incentive compatible delegation menu, the principal’s expected util-
ity, conditional on facing type p (multiplied through by p), can be written as
p · Vp =
∫ ω¯p
ωp
−(xp(ω)− ω)2 dω − b
∫ ω¯p
ωp
2(xp(ω)− ω) dω − pb2
= bup(ωp) +
∫ ω¯p
ωp
up(ω) dω − bup(ω¯p)− pb2. (6)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
information effect
︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss-of-control
effect
The first and the second term in (6) say that the principal’s utility goes up with the
agent’s utility in the states ω ∈ [ωp, ω¯p). However, according to the third term, the
principal’s utility goes down the better off the agent in the highest state ω¯p. Thus, the
principal’s objective is a weighted average of the agent’s utility across states, where the
agent’s utility in the lowest state receives weight b and the agent’s utility in the highest
state receives the negative weight −b.
The decomposition (6) cleanly disentangles the principal’s trade-off. The information
effect corresponds to the agent’s utility gain in states [ωp, ω¯p), and the loss-of-control
effect corresponds to the agent’s utility gain in state ω¯p (which lowers the principal’s
utility).
In what follows, we provide an auxiliary lemma which provides conditions how the
principal’s expected payoff changes when we add a single action to the delegation set.
This will allow us below to check the (sub)optimality of delegation sets by evaluating
those changes. To state the lemma, we introduce the following critical value which will
appear repeatedly throughout the rest of the paper:
β0p ≡ ω¯p − 2b. (7)
Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets.
22 Let p ∈ {h, `} and
21This is formally shown in Lemma 1 of Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009). Intuitively, because xp(ω)
is a maximizer of −(x − ω)2, the envelope theorem implies that u′p(ω) = 2(xp(ω) − ω), whenever the
derivative exists.
22The menu of delegation sets is not required to be incentive compatible here.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 2, (ii).
consider an action y /∈ Dp which is non–redundant in the sense that, when added to the
delegation set, it would be chosen in some state, i.e.,
ωp − |ωp − xp| < y < ω¯p + |ω¯p − x¯p|. (8)
(i) Let y < x¯p. Then adding the action y to Dp improves the principal’s expected utility
if 1
2
(y + x¯p) ≤ ω¯p.
(ii) Let y > x¯p. Then adding the action y to Dp improves the principal’s expected utility
if and only if 1
2
(y + x¯p) < β
0
p .
To understand the lemma, observe first that adding an action that is redundant in
the sense that it is not chosen in any state, will leave the principal’s expected payoff
unchanged. Therefore, we focus only on non–redundant actions as given by condition
(8).
Given non–redundancy, part (i) of the lemma describes when it is beneficial to add
an action that is smaller than the maximal action. The condition 1
2
(y + x¯p) < ω¯p simply
means that the new action y is not chosen by the highest type ω¯p. That this condition is
sufficient for an improvement can be readily seen from (6): Since the highest agent type
ω¯p does not choose the new action y, the loss-of-control effect is not affected by including
y. Since the new action is non–redundant, at least one agent type chooses the new action,
which implies that adding the action strictly improves the utility of a positive mass of
agent types, and thus leads to a strict improvement of the objective via the information
effect.
Part (ii) characterizes when it is beneficial to add a new action to the delegation set
that is larger than the maximal action (see Figure 1). Adding such an action increases
both the information effect (as the utility of all agent types ω in [1
2
(y + x¯p), ω¯p) goes up)
and the loss-of-control effect (because the highest type ω¯p chooses the new action). The
interplay of these two effects is determined by the location of the new action y. If y is
close to x¯p, the information effect is relatively large, and the the loss-of-control effect is
relatively small. When 1
2
(y + x¯p) = β
0
p , the two effects are in balance.
Lemma 2 implies the following lemma.
14
Lemma 3. Consider an arbitrary menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets. Let p ∈ {h, `} and
β0p < y < x¯p ≤ ω¯p. Then replacing Dp by D˜p =
(
Dp ∩ [−∞, y]
) ∪ {y} improves the
principal’s expected utility.
The set D˜p in Lemma 3 is obtained by chopping off a piece of the upper end of
the original delegation set Dp and keeping the action y at which the set was chopped
off. Lemma 3 says that modifying the delegation set in this way is beneficial if the new
maximal action y lies above β0p .
6 Benchmarks
In this section, we discuss two benchmark cases that will play an important role in the
subsequent analysis. First, we consider the principal’s problem when the agent’s ability
type is publicly known. Second, we consider the optimal “static” delegation set which
does not depend on the agent’s ability.
6.1 Publicly known ability
When the agent’s ability is publicly known, the constraint (ICp) in D is redundant,
and the sequential delegation problem reduces to Holmstro¨m’s (1977, 1984) classic static
delegation problem with uniformly distributed state ω. It is well-known that in this case,
the optimal delegation set is an interval with upper endpoint β0p , as defined in (7).
23 Note
that by assumption (1), ωp < β
0
p . We summarize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If the agent’s ability p is publicly known, the solution to the delegation problem
is given by D0p = [ωp, β
0
p ].
We briefly reiterate the reason for the result. The fact that interval delegation is
optimal, can be inferred from (6). Indeed, in state ω¯p, the agent chooses the highest
action available.24 Thus, allowing the agent to pick all smaller actions does not affect
the agent’s utility in the highest state (and so does not lower the principal’s utility), but
(weakly) improves the agent’s utility in the other states [ωp, ω¯p) (and so also improves the
principal’s utility). Extending the interval by including additional higher actions improves
the principal’s utility via the information effect but lowers the principal’s utility via the
loss-of-control effect. At the point β0p , the two effects are in balance (see Lemma 2, (ii)).
23See, for example, Holmstro¨m (1977) or Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009).
24It is not hard to see that offering a delegation set that includes actions larger than ω¯p cannot be
optimal.
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6.2 Optimal static delegation
We refer to a menu of delegation sets as static if it can be implemented with a single
delegation set D.25 In terms of the mechanisms design perspective, this means that both
pieces of the agent’s private information are elicited at the same time.
The principal’s utility under a static delegation set is
V =
∫ ω¯h
ωh
−(x(ω)− (ω − b))2 dF st(ω),
where x(ω) = arg maxx∈D−(x − ω)2 denotes the choice function of the agent under the
delegation set D, and
F st(ω) = µhFh(ω) + µ`F`(ω)
is the average distribution function of the expected state, averaged across the two ability
types.
Analogously to (6), the principal’s utility can be expressed as
V =
µh
h
bu(ωh) +
µ`
`
bu(ω`) +
∫ ω¯h
ωh
u(ω) dF st(ω)
− µh
h
bu(ω¯h)− µ`
`
bu(ω¯`)
− b2, (9)
where u(ω) = −(x(ω) − ω)2 is the agent’s utility. The key difference to the benchmark
case with publicly known types is that, because the delegation set can no longer condition
on the agent’s ability type, now the loss-of-control effect corresponds to the agent’s utility
not only in one state but in two states, as reflected in the second line of (9): conditional on
facing the h-type, the principal’s utility goes down in state ω¯h, and conditional on facing
the `-type, the principal’s utility goes down in state ω¯`. Therefore, the simple argument
that establishes optimality of interval delegation in the benchmark case no longer works.
In fact, consider a delegation set with a maximal action larger than ω¯`. Then it would
never be beneficial to include all actions below this maximal action but to insert a small
gap around the action ω¯`, because the agent’s utility in state ω¯` enters the principal’s
utility with a negative weight −µ`/` · b.
Yet, the argument from the benchmark case can be extended as follows. For any
delegation set containing two actions which are both smaller than the action ω¯`, (9)
implies that the principal’s utility (weakly) goes up when all actions between the two
actions are included in the delegation set. This follows from that fact that, conditional
25For example, the menu of intervals Dh = [ωh, x] and D` = [ω`, x] can be implemented by the single
set D = [ωh, x].
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on each type, adding these actions only improves the information effect yet leaves the loss-
of-control effect unchanged. Similarly, for any delegation set containing two actions which
are both inside (ω¯`, ω¯h), the principal’s utility (weakly) goes up when all actions between
the two actions are included in the delegation set. Therefore, the optimal delegation set
consists of an interval [ωh, x], where x < ω¯`, and a set D
′ which is either an interval or
a single point (within the interval (ω¯`, ω¯h)), or empty. The next two propositions make
this reasoning precise.
Proposition 1. Let b ≥ 1
2
(ω¯h− ω¯`). Then the optimal static delegation set is an interval
of the form
Dst = [ωh, β
st], with βst ∈ [β0` , β0h].
Moreover, the upper endpoint βst monotonically increases in µh with β
st = β0` for µh = 0
and βst = β0h for µh = 1.
To see the intuition for the proposition, observe first that the condition b ≥ 1
2
(ω¯h− ω¯`)
stated in the proposition is equivalent to the condition β0h ≤ ω¯`. Yet if β0h ≤ ω¯`, then,
intuitively, for actions larger than ω¯` the loss-of-control effect dominates the information
effect both conditional on facing the `- and also the h-type. Hence, it would be suboptimal
to include actions larger than ω¯` in the delegation set. That the optimal delegation set
is then an interval follows from the remarks preceding the proposition.
The comparative statics properties of βst are driven by the fact that the principal’s
objective is the weighted average of her objective if she knew the ability type. Therefore,
the optimal upper endpoint is between the optimal upper endpoints of the benchmark
cases with known ability types and converges to the benchmark cases as the principal’s
uncertainty about the agent’s ability diminishes.
Next, we consider the case that β0h > ω¯` (which is equivalent to b <
1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`)). In
this case, the optimal static delegation set consists of an interval plus a point or of two
intervals. This is stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let b < 1
2
(ω¯h−ω¯`) and µh ∈ (0, 1). Then the optimal static delegation set
consists of the disjoint union of an interval and one other set which is either an interval
or a single point, and has a symmetric gap around ω¯`. More precisely, there is d ∈ (0, 2b)
so that
Dst = [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪D′,
where either D′ = [ω¯` + d, β0h] and β
0
h > ω¯` + d, or D
′ = {ω¯` + d} and β0h ≤ ω¯` + d.
To see the intuition, recall from the arguments preceding Proposition 1 that the
optimal delegation set is an interval, or the union of an interval and a point or of two
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Figure 2: Optimal static delegation set (example for h = 1, ` = 0.65, µh = 0.4).
intervals. Observe that if interval delegation was optimal, the arguments above imply
that x¯ < ω¯`. In this case, we could add the action y = ω¯` + (ω¯` − x¯) to the delegation
set without affecting the principal’s payoff conditional on facing type `. However, since
β0h > ω¯`, we have that
1
2
(x¯+ y) = ω¯` < β
0
h, and hence Lemma 2, (ii) implies that adding
the action y would improve the principal’s utility conditional on facing type h.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal static delegation menu (obtained numerically). Fixing
the values of h, `, and µh, consider some b on the vertical axis and draw the corresponding
horizontal line. The optimal static delegation set is then the intersection of that line with
the shaded region.26 For b > 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), the optimal static delegation set is an interval
(Proposition 1). For lower values of b, it is a union of an interval and a point, whereas
for even lower values it is a union of two intervals (Proposition 2).27
Remark 1. It is useful to relate our results on optimal static delegation to the literature.
The static problem has, in some generality, been studied by Alonso and Matouscheck
(2008), by Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009), and by Amador and Bagwell (2012a). These
papers derive conditions for the optimality of interval delegation for the case that the
density associated with the distribution of the state is continuous. We cannot directly
apply these results, because in our case, f st is not continuous, as it has jumps at the points
ω = ω` and ω = ω¯`; thus, f
st is only piece-wise continuous. In principle, the methods
of Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009) can be extended even if the density is not continuous as
long at the environment is “regular”. Yet, our environment is not regular for all biases.
This is the main reason why we consider a setup with two ability types. A major obstacle
26The horizontal axis depicts the state and the actions. Note that for h = 1, we have ωh = 0 and
ω¯h = 1. The dashed diagonal lines (labeled β
0
` and β
0
h) show the upper endpoints of the optimal
delegation sets if the agent’s type is publicly known.
27Note that while the delegation set is discontinuous at b = 12 (ω¯h− ω¯`), the principal’s expected utility
is continuous. If x¯ = ω¯` − d, then adding the action ω¯` + d does not influence the principal’s expected
payoff, as 12 (ω¯` − d+ ω¯` + d) = ω¯` = β0h (see Lemma 2, (ii)).
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to go beyond this case is the difficulty to characterize the optimal static delegation set.28
7 Optimal sequential delegation
In this section, we derive the optimal sequential delegation menu when the agent’s ability
type is his private information. We say that static delegation is optimal, if there exists
a static delegation menu that solves the principal’s problem. Otherwise, the agent’s
ability type is explicitly screened at the optimum, and we say that sequential delegation
is optimal.
Our approach to solving the principal’s problem is to first consider a relaxed problem
where we ignore one incentive constraint. We then show that the optimal delegation
menu for the relaxed problem must be in a class of simple delegation menus which are
pinned down by three parameters (Lemmas 5 and 6). In a second step, we establish that a
solution to the relaxed problem automatically satisfies the other incentive constraint and
thus also solves the original problem (Lemma 7). These two steps will then allow us to
determine the optimal delegation menu by optimizing over menus in the class mentioned
above.
The benchmark case with publicly known ability types as described in Lemma 4
suggests that we can ignore the high type’s incentive constraint. To see this, observe that
in the benchmark case, the high type’s delegation set is larger than that of the low type:
D0h = [ωh, β
0
h] ⊃ [ω`, β0` ] = D0` . Thus, the low ability type would have an incentive to
pretend to be of high ability. This intuitively suggests that with privately known ability
types, the low type’s incentive constraint is binding at the optimum. Thus, we consider
the relaxed delegation problem
DR : max
(Dh,D`)
∑
p∈{h,`}
µp
∫ ω¯p
ωp
−(xp(ω)− (ω − b))2 1
p
dω s.t. (A), (IC`).
where we ignore the (ICh) constraint. We denote a solution to DR by (D∗h, D∗` ).
We shall now formally confirm the intuition that (IC`) is binding, and moreover that
the low ability type is offered an interval at the optimum of the relaxed problem.
28More precisely, in Kova´cˇ and Mylovanov (2009), regularity means that the function g(ω) ≡ 1 −
F st(ω) − bfst(ω) is decreasing at the point ω whenever 0 ≤ g(ω) ≤ 1. For small bias, the function g
jumps upward to a value larger than 0 at the point ω¯`, thus violating regularity. Moreover, the more
ability types p one allows for, the “more” irregular g becomes. (That fst is only piece-wise continuous
causes minor problems only.) This is so since g makes an upward jump at each point ω¯p. Note that
this observation remains true if the state θ is not uniformly distributed. One could, of course, allow for
more ability types and impose assumptions (e.g., on b) that guarantee regularity. However, our analysis
below suggests that the comparison between static and sequential delegation becomes interesting exactly
in irregular cases. Therefore, excluding irregular cases would be a loss.
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Lemma 5. At the solution to the relaxed problem DR, (IC`) is binding and D∗` is an
interval of the form
D∗` = [ω`, x¯
∗
` ], where x¯
∗
` ∈ [β0` , ω¯`].
The fact that the delegation set for the low type is an interval is a consequence of the
effects stated in Lemma 2. Suppose for example that D∗` contained gaps. Then filling the
gaps (adding the actions inside) would clearly improve the `-type’s utility from picking
the modified delegation set and thus relax the incentive constraint. At the same time,
filling gaps would improve the principal’s expected utility by Lemma 2, (i).
We shall now exploit the fact that (IC`) is binding to derive restrictions on the
optimal delegation set D∗h. Towards this end, we first provide a representation of the
optimal delegation menu of the relaxed problem. The following lemma says that the high
type’s delegation is a union of two connected sets.
Lemma 6. Without loss of generality, the high type’s delegation set at the optimum of
the relaxed problem DR is a union of at most two connected sets. If b ≥ 1
2
(ω¯h− ω¯`), then
D∗h takes one of the following two forms:
(i) D∗h = {γ1} ∪ {γ2}, where γ1 ≤ ωh < γ2.
(ii) D∗h = [ωh, γ1] ∪ {γ2}, where ωh < γ1 ≤ γ2.
If b < 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), then D∗h is of the form (ii) or of the form:
(iii) D∗h = [ωh, γ1] ∪ [γ2, β0h], where ωh < γ1 ≤ ω¯` ≤ γ2 < β0h.
Moreover, in all cases the following inequalities hold: γ1 ≤ x¯∗` ≤ γ2 and 12(x¯∗` + γ2) ≤ ω¯`.
Let us emphasize that the optimal static delegation sets from Propositions 1 and 2
are included in the class of menus described in Lemma 6: Interval delegation occurs if D∗h
is of the form (ii) and γ1 = γ2 = x¯
∗
` . Moreover, the static delegation set from Proposition
2 occurs if γ1 = x¯
∗
` and γ2 = ω¯` + d with d = ω¯` − x¯∗` .
Note also that Lemma 6 does not claim that D∗h is of the specified form in every
optimal delegation menu. Rather, it states that for any optimal delegation menu (D∗h, D
∗
` )
there is a delegation set D˜h of the form described in Lemma 6 such that the menu (D˜h, D
∗
` )
is optimal as well.
The intuition is as follows. Given the delegation menu (D∗h, D
∗
` ), we construct the set
D˜h so that it (weakly) improves the principal’s expected utility and at the same time
preserves the binding (IC`). It is easiest to illustrate the argument for the case when the
largest action in D∗h, action x¯
∗
h, is chosen by the agent in state ω¯` from D
∗
h. In the proof
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Figure 3: Construction of the set D˜h from D
∗
h (Lemma 6).
of the lemma, we show that optimality requires that the smallest action in D∗h, action
x∗h, is not larger than ωh. For simplicity, consider now only the case x
∗
h = ωh. Then
[ωh, x¯
∗
h] ⊇ D∗h ⊇ {ωh, x¯∗h}, and thus, type ` (weakly) prefers the interval [ωh, x¯∗h] over D∗h
and (weakly) prefers D∗h over the two-action set {ωh, x¯∗h}. Hence, since (IC`) is binding,
type ` also prefers [ωh, x¯
∗
h] over D
∗
` , and D
∗
` over {ωh, x¯∗h}. Therefore, an intermediate
value argument implies that there is an action γ1 ∈ [ωh, x¯∗h] such that type ` remains
indifferent between the set D∗` and the set [ωh, γ1]∪{x¯∗h}. We now choose D˜h to be equal
to [ωh, γ1]∪{x¯∗h} and consider the modified delegation menu (D˜h, D∗` ). The delegation set
for the h-type is thus of the form (ii) as stated in Lemma 6 with γ2 = x¯
∗
h (see Figure 3).
Moreover, by construction, (IC`) is binding under the modified delegation menu.
We now argue that the principal’s expected utility (weakly) improves by the modi-
fication. While, by construction, the value from D∗h and D˜h is the same conditional on
the low agent type’s belief about the expected state, all that matters for the principal is
the utility from D∗h and D˜h, conditional on facing the high ability type. But observe that
the conditional distribution of the expected state is uniform conditional on both the high
and the low ability type. Therefore, the principal effectively evaluates D∗h and D˜h with
the same beliefs as the low agent type. Thus, if the change does not affect the agent’s
choices in states ω ∈ [ωh, ω`], also the principal’s expected utility is unaffected by the
change. On the other hand, if it does affect the h-type’s choices in states ω ∈ [ωh, ω`],
the delegation set D˜h (weakly) improves the principal’s expected utility.
29
Lemma 6 characterizes the shape of the optimal delegation menu for the relaxed
problem. We now show that any delegation menu in the class described in Lemma 6
automatically satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint for type h. Therefore, a
solution to the relaxed problem is automatically a solution to the original problem.
Lemma 7. A solution (D∗h, D
∗
` ) to the relaxed problem DR of the form as in Lemmas 5
and 6 is also a solution to the original problem D.
The basic idea behind Lemma 7 is as follows. Suppose there is a sequential solution
29If the underlying state θ is not uniformly distributed, a change of Dh that leaves the low type
indifferent does not necessarily leave the principal indifferent, because the conditional distributions of
the expected state, conditional on the various ability types, are not linear transformations of one another.
In Section 8, we provide a sufficient condition so that the argument extends to the non-uniform case.
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(D∗h, D
∗
` ) to the relaxed problem that violates (ICh).
30 Then, since (ICh) is violated, the
h-type’s utility would be improved when the agent was offered the static menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ),
where D˜h = [ωh, ω`] ∪ D∗` = [ωh, x¯∗` ].31 In terms of the principal’s utility, by (6), a
modification that improves the h-type’s utility improves the objective by the information
effect. Moreover, since x¯∗h ≥ x¯∗` by Lemma 6, the utility of the highest type ω¯h is higher
under D∗h than under D˜h, and therefore, the loss-of-control effect is smaller under D˜h
than under D∗h. Consequently, if (ICh) is violated, offering the static menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ) is
an improvement in terms of both the information and the loss-of-control effect.
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 imply that the optimal delegation menu can be found by
optimizing over the class described in Lemma 6. According to Lemma 6, the properties
of the h–type’s optimal delegation set D∗h depend on whether, for the static problem,
interval delegation is optimal or not (see Propositions 1 and 2). We now make this case
distinction.
7.1 Large bias: b ≥ 12(ω¯h − ω¯`)
We now consider the set of biases so that interval delegation is optimal in the static
problem. Recall that this is the case if b ≥ 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), or equivalently,
β0h ≤ ω¯`. (10)
Propositions 3 and 4 below characterize the solution to the principal’s problem. The
propositions say that sequential delegation is optimal if and only if the bias is small
(relative to ω¯h − ω¯`) and the prior probability of the high type, µh, is not too large.
Lemma 6 implies that in this case D∗h is a union of an interval and an isolated point, or
it is a two-action set. Otherwise, static delegation remains optimal.
Proposition 3. Let b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`. Then static interval delegation is optimal for problem
D. The optimum is achieved at the delegation set Dst = [ωh, βst].
Proposition 4. Let 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`) ≤ b < ω¯h − ω¯`, and define32
bˆ ≡ 1 +
√
5
4
(ω¯h − ω¯`). (11)
Then for every b ∈ [1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), bˆ
)
there is µˆh(b) ∈ (0, 1] such that:
30Clearly, a static solution meets (ICh).
31This menu is indeed static, as it can be implemented by offering the delegation set D˜h = [ωh, x¯
∗
` ] to
both types.
32Observe that 12 (1 +
√
5) ≈ 1.62 is the Golden ratio.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Propositions 3 and 4 (for h = 1, ` = 0.65).
(i) If b ≥ bˆ, or if b < bˆ and µ ≥ µˆh(b), then static delegation is optimal for problem D.
The optimum is achieved at the delegation set Dst = [ωh, β
st].
(ii) If b < bˆ and µ < µˆh(b), then sequential delegation is optimal for problem D.
Figure 4 illustrates Propositions 3 and 4 graphically. In the range b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`, static
delegation is optimal. When ω¯h − ω¯` > b ≥ 12(ω¯h − ω¯`), sequential delegation is optimal
if and only if µh lies below the µˆh curve. (For the range b <
1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`) we show in the
next subsection that sequential delegation is optimal.)
To illuminate the forces behind the result, we shall identify the costs and benefits of
sequential delegation. For a fixed delegation set of the low type, the principal’s choice
of the high type’s delegation set is restricted by the incentive compatibility requirement
that (IC`) be binding. This pins down the agent’s utility from the high type’s delegation
set, aggregated over the range of the low type’s support [ω`, ω¯`]:
` · U` =
∫ ω¯`
ω`
u`(ω) dω =
∫ ω¯`
ω`
uh(ω) dω. (12)
Therefore, by (6), the principal’s expected utility, conditional on facing the h-type, can
be expressed as
h · Vh = ` · U` +
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω +
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
uh(ω) dω + buh(ωh)− buh(ω¯h)− hb2. (13)
Again, we can identify an information and a loss-of-control effect. The information effect
corresponds to the agent’s utility gain in states ω ∈ [ωh, ω`) ∪ (ω¯`, ω¯h), and the loss-of-
control effect corresponds to the agent’s utility gain in state ω¯h (which lowers the princi-
pal’s utility). Observe that, compared to the benchmark case with publicly known ability
types, since U` is fixed by incentive compatibility, the information effect is diminished, as
the principal now only benefits from the agent’s utility in states ω ∈ [ωh, ω`) ∪ (ω¯`, ω¯h),
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Figure 5: Marginal sequential delegation.
but the loss-of-control effect is the same as in the benchmark case. In this sense, the cost
of incentive compatibility is that it weakens the information effect with respect to the
high ability type.
To understand the effects of sequential delegation more specifically, it is useful to
consider marginal changes of the optimal static delegation set. Recall that for the case
under consideration in this subsection (b ≥ 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`)), the optimal static delegation
set is an interval Dst = [ωh, β
st] by Proposition 1. Now suppose that, instead of offering
the static menu (Dst, Dst), the principal offers the sequential delegation menu where the
`-type’s delegation set is maintained and the upper endpoint of the h-type’s delegation
set is slightly increased by ε and an appropriate gap with length η + ε (where η depends
on ε) is inserted in Dh to maintain incentive compatibility (see Figure 5):
D˜` = D
st, D˜h(ε) = [ωh, β
st − η] ∪ {βst + ε}. (14)
We refer to this modification as marginal sequential delegation. Since marginal sequential
delegation is feasible for the relaxed problem DR, it follows that if marginal sequential
delegation is beneficial (relative to static delegation), then some sequential delegation
menu is optimal for the relaxed problem, and thus, by Lemma 7 also for the original
problem. We now investigate when marginal sequential delegation is beneficial.
We may use (13) to evaluate the effect of marginal sequential delegation on the prin-
cipal’s utility, conditional on facing the h-type. Since the increase of the upper endpoint
by ε is only marginal, the gap necessary to maintain incentive compatibility is also only
marginal. In particular, as under static delegation, all actions [ωh, ω`) will be included
in the h-type’s modified delegation set. Hence, marginal sequential delegation does not
affect that part of the information effect that is attributable to the agent’s utility in states
ω ∈ [ωh, ω`) (the second and fourth term in (13)). Yet it does affect both what remains
from the information effect (the third term in (13)) and the loss-of-control effect (the fifth
term in (13)).
Since the upper endpoint, βst, of the optimal static delegation set is smaller than
β0h by Proposition 1, it is also smaller than ω¯` by condition (10). Therefore, in states
ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h], the agent chooses the highest action from the h-type’s delegation set both
under static and under marginal sequential delegation. Together with the argument in
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the previous paragraph, this implies that the benefit of marginal sequential delegation
can be expressed as (recall that η is a function of ε):
h
dV˜h(ε)
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
=
d
dε
{∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
−(βst + ε− ω)2 dω − b[−(βst + ε− ω¯h)2]
}∣∣∣∣
ε=0
, (15)
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
information
effect
loss-of-control
effect
where V˜h(ε) is the principal’s expected utility from the delegation set D˜h(ε) defined in
(14). Observe that both the information and the loss-of-control effect go up through
marginal sequential delegation, as the agent now obtains a higher utility in all relevant
states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h]. Hence, what matters is how the two effects increase relative to one
another. Three forces drive the relative size of the information and the loss-of-control
effect.
First, because the agent’s utility is quadratic, the agent’s utility increases by more
in state ω¯h than in any state ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h) when the upper endpoint of the h-type’s
delegation set is marginally increased from βst to βst + ε. Yet, the difference in the
increase is smaller the smaller is the action βst. This is because the agent’s loss function
is concave so that the difference between the marginal loss in state ω¯h and in some state
ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h) diminishes as the loss becomes large. Therefore, the smaller is βst, the
more the information effect works in favor of marginal sequential delegation. Recall from
Proposition 1 that βst increases in the likelihood µh of the h-type.
Second, the loss-of-control effect is evidently less pronounced, the smaller is the bias.
Thus, the smaller is b, the less the loss-of-control effect works against marginal sequential
delegation. Third, the information effect is more pronounced the larger is the interval
[ω¯`, ω¯h). Thus, the larger is ω¯h − ω¯`, the more the information effect works in favor of
marginal sequential delegation.
We now explain how these effects play out for the cases distinguished in Propositions
3 and 4. Consider first Proposition 3, i.e., b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`. As said above, marginally
increasing the upper endpoint of the h-type’s delegation increases the agent’s utility by
more in state ω¯h than in states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h). Therefore, the agent’s utility increase
in state ω¯h, multiplied by b, is larger than the agent’s aggregate utility increase over
the range [ω¯`, ω¯h) which has measure ω¯h − ω¯` smaller than b. Thus, the loss-of-control
effect dominates the information effect. This shows that, for b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`, the principal
cannot benefit from marginal sequential delegation. While this argument deals only with
marginal modifications of the optimal static delegation menu, the proof of Proposition
3 shows that, in fact, no profitable modification of the optimal static delegation menu
25
exists when b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`.
Next, consider Proposition 4, where b < ω¯h − ω¯`. As argued above, the benefit of
marginal sequential delegation is large when b and µh are small and ω¯h − ω¯` is large.
A computation shows that at the values b = bˆ and µh = µˆh, the benefit of marginal
sequential delegation (15) is zero. Thus, for the parameter constellation in part (ii)
of Proposition 4, marginal sequential delegation improves upon static delegation, and a
fortiori, some sequential delegation menu must be the solution to the principal’s problem.
Likewise, for the parameter constellation in part (i) of Proposition 4, marginal se-
quential delegation does not improve upon static delegation. In principle, therefore, a
non-marginal modification of the static delegation menu could be profitable. That this
is not the case, can intuitively be seen from (13) and the insight from Lemma 6 that the
optimal delegation set for the h-type is an interval plus an action, or it is a two–action
set. Because a marginal modification is not profitable, any increase of the upper endpoint
of the h-type’s delegation set increases the agent’s utility in state ω¯h (times b) by more
than the agent’s aggregate utility over the states [ω¯`, ω¯h). Hence, by (13), any potential
gain from a non-marginal modification must come from the effect it has on the agent’s
utility in state ωh and on the agent’s aggregate utility over the states (ωh, ω`). But the
agent’s utility in those states is already maximized under marginal sequential delegation.
Hence, there is no room for a non-marginal modification to yield the principal additional
utility.
This concludes our discussion of the case where the agent’s bias is relatively large.
Next, we turn to the case with small bias.
7.2 Small bias: b < 12(ω¯h − ω¯`)
We now consider the set of biases so that interval delegation is no longer optimal in the
static problem. Recall that this is the case if b < 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), or equivalently,
β0h > ω¯`. (16)
We show that in this case, sequential delegation is always strictly better than static
delegation.
Proposition 5. Let b < 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`). Then sequential delegation is optimal for the prin-
cipal’s problem D.
The intuition can again be best understood in terms of the information and the loss-
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of-control effect as captured by expression (13) which, for convenience, we reiterate:
h · Vh = ` · U` +
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω +
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
uh(ω) dω + buh(ωh)− buh(ω¯h)− hb2. (17)
Recall that by Proposition 2, the optimal static delegation set is the disjoint union of
an interval and one other set which is either an interval or a single point, and has a
symmetric gap around ω¯`. For the sake of the discussion, suppose it is the union of an
interval and a single point (the argument for the other case is identical):
Dst = [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪ {ω¯` + d}, with ω¯` + d ≤ ω¯h. (18)
Consider a modification of the optimal static delegation menu where the delegation set
of the low type is the same as under static delegation except that the action {ω¯` + d} is
removed: D˜` = [ωh, ω¯`− d]. Further, the delegation set of the high type is obtained from
Dst by chopping off a piece of the upper end of the interval and adding a small interval
to the left of the upper endpoint so that (IC`) remains binding:
D˜h(ε) = [ωh, ω¯` − d− η] ∪ [ω¯` + d− ε, ω¯` + d], η, ε > 0. (19)
We now argue that this modification is profitable for the principal. Since the modification
is feasible for the relaxed problem DR, some sequential delegation menu is therefore
optimal for the relaxed problem, and thus, by Lemma 7, also for the original problem.
To see that the modification is profitable, observe that because D˜` and D
st induce
the same action for the `-type agent, the modification does not affect the principal’s
utility conditional on facing the `-type. The effect on the principal’s utility conditional
on facing the h-type can be seen from (17). Because the agent’s utility in state ω¯h has
not changed under the modification, the loss-of-control effect — the term buh(ω¯h) in (17)
— is unaffected by the modification.
Consider next the impact of the modification on the information effect — the second
to fourth terms in (17). Suppose that ε (and thus η) is so small that ω¯` − d − η > ω`
(we may always find such an ε). Then the information effect that is attributable to
the agent’s utility in states ω ∈ [ωh, ω`] — the second and fourth term in (17) — is
not affected by the modification. But, the information effect that is attributable to the
agent’s utility in states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h) — the third term in (17) — does increase under the
modification. To see this, observe that since the modification maintains (IC`), it must
be that in states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯` + d − ε], the agent chooses the action ω¯` + d − ε under
the modification, whereas under static delegation he chooses the worse action ω¯` + d.
Moreover, in states ω ∈ [ω¯` + d− ε, ω¯` + d), the agent gets his ideal action ω under the
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Figure 6: Optimal sequential delegation menu (example for h = 1, ` = 0.65, µ = 0.4).
modification, whereas under static delegation he chooses the worse action ω¯`+d. Finally,
in states ω ∈ [ω¯` + d, ω¯h] the agent’s action under the modification is the same as under
static delegation. In sum, the principal’s expected utility unambiguously goes up under
the modification, and thus, a sequential delegation menu is strictly better than static
delegation.
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal delegation menu (for the same values of h, `, and µ
as in Figure 2). The intersection of a horizontal line (for some b) with the shaded region
shows the h-type’s delegation set D∗h at the optimal delegation menu. In addition, the
figure depicts the upper endpoint x¯∗` of the optimal delegation set D
∗
` = [ω`, x¯
∗
` ] for the
`-type. For b sufficiently large, static delegation is optimal. For intermediate values of
b, the h-type’s optimal delegation set is a union of an interval and a point, while for b
sufficiently small it becomes a union of two intervals.33
8 Extension beyond the uniform distribution
In this section, we provide a generalization of our results to the case that the state of the
world is not uniformly distributed. Instead, we assume that θ is distributed according
to some cumulative distribution function F on the unit interval with full support. We
denote by f = F ′ the density, and by φ the mean of this distribution. As before, let
ω˜ = ps˜+(1−p)φ be the expected state, conditional on the signal s˜, where s˜ is identically
distributed as but stochastically independent from the state. Then the random variable
33The figure suggests that whenever D∗h is a union of two intervals, then the higher interval is of the
form [ω¯`, β
0
h]. Indeed, the fact that its upper endpoint is β
0
h follows from Lemma 6, form (iii). In addition,
it can be shown that if ω` < γ1 (at the optimum), then γ2 = ω¯`.
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ω˜ is distributed with cumulative distribution function and density
Fp(ω) = F
(
φ+
ω − φ
p
)
and fp(ω) =
1
p
· f
(
φ+
ω − φ
p
)
(20)
on the support [ωp, ω¯p] = [(1− p)φ, p+ (1− p)φ], and has the mean φ.
We can apply the same steps as in the uniform case to obtain the analogue to the
decomposition (6) for the principal’s expected utility conditional on facing type p:
Vp = bup(ωp)fp(ωp) +
∫ ω¯p
ωp
up(ω)[fp(ω) + bf
′
p(ω)] dω − bup(ω¯p)fp(ω¯p)− b2. (21)
To highlight the essential issues, we focus our discussion on the case that interval
delegation is optimal both when the expert’s ability is public information and under
static delegation when ability is private information (corresponding to the “large bias”
case with the uniform distribution). A set of sufficient conditions for this to be the case
is the following.
A1. b < `φ.
A2. The density f is non-decreasing and differentiable with a bounded derivative on [0, 1].
A3.
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
[1− Fh(ω)− bfh(ω)] dω < 0.
A4.
∫ 1
z
[1− F (ω)] dω
1− F (z) is convex in z on [0, 1).
Assumption A1 is a generalization of our assumption (1). In the terminology of
Alonso and Matouscheck (2008), it implies that delegation is valuable conditional on
each type. Assumption A2 ensures that the first two terms in (21) are positive and
therefore correspond to an information effect. This implies that in the case with publicly
known ability p, inserting gaps in the delegation set is never optimal. Assumption A3
corresponds to the case where the bias is large (as in Proposition 1 and in Section 7.1).34
Finally, Assumption A4 is an additional technical assumption.
Assumptions A1–A4 allow us to prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 8. Let Assumptions A1–A4 hold. If the expert’s ability p is public information,
then interval delegation is optimal with optimal delegation set Dp = [ωp, β
0
p ], where β
0
p ∈
(ωp, ω¯p) is the unique solution to the equation∫ ω¯p
β
[1− Fp(ω)− bfp(ω)] dω = 0. (22)
Moreover, 0 < β0h − β0` ≤ ω¯h − ω¯`.
34For the uniform distribution, Assumption A3 becomes (ω¯h − ω¯`)(ω¯h − ω¯` − 2b)/(2h) < 0.
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Lemma 9. Let Assumptions A1–A4 hold. If p is private information of the expert, then
the optimal static delegation set is an interval Dst = [ωh, β
st] where βst ∈ (β0` , β0h).
We next offer a sufficient condition such that our insight from Lemma 5 and 6 still
remains valid that the optimal delegation menu consists of two disjoint connected sets
for the high and an interval for the low type. Intuitively, for the same reason as in the
uniform case, the critical incentive constraint is the one for the low ability type. Hence,
we consider the relaxed problem where we ignore the high type’s incentive constraint. As
in the uniform case, it is then easy to see that the low type’s delegation set is an interval
at the optimum. Now assume, contrary to what we claim, that Dh does not consist of
two disjoint connected sets and contains several gaps. Then we can “merge” the several
gaps in Dh into a single gap and move it to the upper end so that the resulting set is an
interval plus a point. By the same intermediate value argument as in the uniform case we
can perform this modification so that the incentive constraint for the low type maintains
to be binding.
The key question is then how this modification affects the principal’s expected utility.
Effectively, the modification shifts the loss due to gaps from relatively low states to higher
states ω. Therefore, if the modification is to be profitable, then the principal, conditional
on facing the high type, needs to benefit more than the low type agent—when selecting
the delegation set Dh—from suffering losses in relatively high than in low states. By
(21), the principal weighs the loss uh(ω) in state ω with the factor fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω). In
contrast, the low type agent—when picking Dh—weighs the loss uh(ω) in state ω with
the factor f`(ω). Hence, if the low type agent is indifferent between the losses suffered in
the original delegation set (i.e., in relatively small states) and the modified delegation set
(i.e., in relatively large states), the principal gains from the modification if f`(ω) increases
faster than fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω), that is, if
fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)
f`(ω)
is non-increasing in ω. (23)
Thus, if (23) holds, then the optimal delegation menu for the relaxed problem consists
of two disjoint connected sets for the high and an interval for the low type. As it turns
out, this delegation menu is also a solution to the original problem, if
fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)
fh(ω)
is non-increasing in ω. (24)
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A sufficient condition for (23) and (24) to hold independently of b is the following.35,36
A5. f is log-concave on [0, 1] and fh(ω)/f`(ω) is non-increasing on [ω`, ω¯`].
We formally confirm the previous considerations in the next lemma which provides a
generalization of Lemmas 6 and 7.
Lemma 10. Let Assumptions A1–A5 hold. Then, at the optimal delegation menu, the
`–type’s delegation set is an interval D∗` = [ω`, x¯
∗
` ] with x¯
∗
` ∈ [β0` , ω¯`], and the h–type’s
delegation set is without loss of generality a union of two connected sets of the form
(i) D∗h = {γ1} ∪ {γ2}, where γ1 ≤ ωh < γ2, or
(ii) D∗h = [ωh, γ1] ∪ {γ2}, where ωh < γ1 ≤ γ2.
Lemma 10 implies that if sequential delegation is optimal, then the delegation set of
the high type can be taken, without loss of generality, as (possibly degenerate) interval
plus a point. We now address the question when sequential delegation is optimal. We
first show that for sufficiently large bias (corresponding to the condition b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯` for
the uniform distribution), static delegation is optimal, generalizing Proposition 3.
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions A1–A5 hold. In addition, let 1−Fh(ω¯`)− bfh(ω¯`) ≤ 0.
Then static interval delegation is optimal for the problem D. The optimum is achieved
at the delegation set Dst = [ωh, β
st].
Let us now focus on the case when Proposition 6 does not apply, i.e., 1 − Fh(ω¯`) −
bfh(ω¯`) > 0. Instead of providing a full characterization (as in Proposition 4), we confine
ourselves to provide a sufficient condition for when marginal sequential delegation is
profitable, where the delegation menu corresponding to marginal sequential delegation is
defined as in (14). Of course, this then implies that sequential delegation is optimal. We
begin by characterizing when it is profitable to marginally modify the static delegation
menu consisting of the interval [ωh, β] with an arbitrary upper endpoint β (instead of
βst).
Lemma 11. Consider β ∈ (ω`, ω¯`) and let us denote
∆Vh ≡ −fh(β) + bf
′
h(β)
f`(β)
· 2
∫ ω¯`
β
[1− F`(ω)] dω + 2
∫ ω¯h
β
[1− Fh(ω)− bfh(ω)] dω. (25)
35The log-concavity of f implies also log-concavity of fh. Thus, f
′
h/fh and also (fh + bf
′
h)/fh =
1 + bf ′h/fh are non-increasing. Then (fh + bf
′
h)/f` = (fh + bf
′
h)/fh · fh/f` is non-increasing as well.
Finally, note that zf ′(z)/f(z) being non-decreasing is sufficient for fh/f` being non-increasing for every
` < h.
36One may wonder whether the Assumptions A1–A5 are not inconsistent with one another. It is,
however, easy to check that, for example, F (θ) = θ2 satisfies all assumptions for appropriately chosen
values of `, h and b (see Appendix).
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Then, if ∆Vh > 0, and only if ∆Vh ≥ 0, marginal sequential delegation improves the
principal’s expected utility compared to the static delegation set [ωh, β].
Next, we provide a sufficient condition so that the condition for the profitability of
marginal sequential delegation is satisfied at the optimal static delegation set [0, βst].
Proposition 7. Consider a distribution satisfying A2 and A4. Let 0 < ` < h ≤ 1 be
such that Assumptions A1 and A3 are satisfied for some b0 > 0. Then there exists an
open set of parameters (b, µh) such that A1 and A3 are satisfied, and marginal sequential
delegation improves upon static delegation.
Proposition 7 identifies a range of parameters so that sequential delegation is optimal.
If, in addition, A5 holds, then by Lemma 10, the good expert is offered a set of extreme
decisions, and the bad expert is offered an interval of moderate decisions. Hence, the
qualitative features of our results for the uniform case are robust and carry over to the
case with more general distributions that satisfy the conditions A1–A5. Deriving the
exact parametric conditions for the optimality of sequential delegation that parallel the
simple conditions in the uniform case is beyond the scope of the current paper.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided insights into the nature of optimal delegation when the
agent’s private information arrives over time. Our key insight is that the principal can
design a menu of delegation sets to elicit the agent’s privately known expertise. In doing
so, the principal offers the good expert a set of extreme decisions and the bad expert a
set of moderate decisions to choose from. This provides a novel rationale for limiting the
discretion of privately informed experts, next to restraining experts to pursue partisan
interests or to motivate them to acquire information.
The optimal mechanism design approach adopted in our paper requires that actions
are contractible and that the principal can commit to a mechanism. This approach is
useful, as it characterizes the upper bound on what the principal can attain when she
is constrained only by the agent’s private information. An interesting avenue for future
work is to relax the principal’s commitment power. Starting with Crawford and Sobel
(1982), there is a huge literature that investigates the static problem when actions are
not contractible and the parties have to rely on non-binding forms of communication
such as cheap talk. A question that can be addressed within the model of this paper is
how the nature of non-binding communication is affected by the sequential arrival of new
information.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) By assumption, 1
2
(y + x¯p) ≤ ω¯p. Therefore, adding y does not
modify the agent’s utility in state ω¯p. In addition, (8) implies that some agent type
ω ∈ [ωp, ω¯p] chooses y. Hence, adding y strictly improves the agent’s utility in some
neighborhood of y when y > ωp, or in some neighborhood of ωp when y ≤ ωp. By (6),
these observations imply that adding y strictly improves the principal’s utility.
(ii) Let us first consider the case x¯p ≥ ωp. Condition (8) implies that 12(y + x¯p) < ω¯p.
Thus, by (6), the principal’s utility from D˜p = Dp∪{y} and Dp are respectively given by
p · V˜p = C +
∫ (y+x¯p)/2
x¯p
(x¯p − ω)2 dω −
∫ ω¯p
(y+x¯p)/2
(y − ω)2 dω + b(y − ω¯p)2 − pb2, (26)
p · Vp = C +
∫ ω¯p
x¯p
(x¯p − ω)2 dω + b(x¯p − ω¯p)2 − pb2, (27)
where C is the principal’s utility, conditional on the states [ωp, x¯p] which is the same for
both delegation sets. Thus,
p(V˜p − Vp) = −
∫ ω¯p
(y+x¯p)/2
[(y − ω)2 − (x¯p − ω)2] dω + b[(y − ω¯p)2 − (x¯p − ω¯p)2]. (28)
The integral is equal to
−
∫ ω¯p
(y+x¯p)/2
(y − x¯p)(y + x¯p − 2ω) dω = (y − x¯p)
(
y + x¯p
2
− ω¯p
)2
. (29)
The second term in p(V˜p − Vp) can be written as
b[(y − ω¯p)2 − (x¯p − ω¯p)2] = b(y − x¯p)(y + x¯p − 2ω¯p) = 2b(y − x¯p)
(
y + x¯p
2
− ω¯p
)
. (30)
Hence,
p(V˜p − Vp) = (y − x¯p)
(
ω¯p − y + x¯p
2
)(
ω¯p − y + x¯p
2
− 2b
)
. (31)
Since the first two factors are positive by assumption, we obtain that p(V˜p − Vp) > 0 is
equivalent to 1
2
(y + x¯p) < ω¯p − 2b = β0p , as desired.
Second, consider the case x¯p < ωp <
1
2
(y + x¯p). Due to non-redundancy, we have
Dp = {x¯p} and D˜p = {x¯p, y}. In this case, the lower bound in the integrals in (26) and
(27) is ω¯p instead of x¯p. The formula (31) as well as the rest of the proof remain the
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same.
Finally, third, consider the case 1
2
(y + x¯p) ≤ ωp. We show that in this case, adding
y improves the principal’s expected utility (recall that ωp < β
0
p). Note that now non-
redundancy implies that Dp = {x¯p} and D˜p = {y}, as in D˜p the action x¯p becomes
redundant. Let us for any z ∈ R define
σ(z) = −b(z − ωp)2 −
∫ ω¯p
ωp
(z − ω)2 dω + b(z − ω¯p)2 − pb2 (32)
the principal’s expected utility (scaled by p) from a singleton delegation set {z}. Then
p · Vp = σ(x¯p) and p · V˜p = σ(y) and a direct computation gives
p(V˜p − Vp) = (ω¯p − ωp)(y − x¯p)[ωp + ω¯p − (y + x¯p)− 2b]. (33)
The first and the second brackets are clearly positive. The third bracket is also positive,
as ωp + ω¯p − (y + x¯p) ≥ ωp + ω¯p − 2ωp = ω¯p − ωp = ` > 2b, where the first inequality
follows from 1
2
(y + x¯p) ≤ ωp, assumed in this case, and the second inequality follows
from assumption (1). Thus, we have shown that indeed V˜p > Vp, which completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider first the case that [y, x¯p] ⊆ Dp. Then Dp = D˜p ∪ (y, x¯p]
which means that Dp can be obtained by adding actions y
′ from the interval (y, x¯p] to
D˜p. Since y is the maximal action in D˜p, and since y
′ ≤ ω¯p, such an action y′ is non-
redundant for the set D˜p. Moreover, the average of y = max D˜p and y
′ is larger than β0p
since y ≥ β0p . Hence, Lemma 2, (ii), implies that adding y′ to D˜p lowers the principal’s
expected utility. Therefore, the set D˜p yields the principal a higher expected utility than
the set Dp, as we wanted to show.
Next, consider the case that [y, x¯p] 6⊆ Dp. Then adding all (missing) actions in the
interval [y, x¯p) causes an improvement for the principal by (6), because the action chosen
by type ω¯p, and thus his utility is not affected by the availability of the new actions.
Together with the argument in the previous paragraph, this implies that the principal is
better of with D˜p than with Dp, as desired.
A.2 Proofs for Section 6
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 make use of the following auxiliary lemma.
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Lemma 12. The optimal static delegation set is given by the union of an interval [ωh, ω¯`−
d] and an additional set D′, where d ∈ [0, ω¯h − ω¯`] and
D′ = ∅, or D′ = {ω¯` + d}, or D′ = [ω¯` + d, x¯] (34)
for some x¯ ∈ [ω¯` + d, ω¯h].
Proof of Lemma 12. Let D be an optimal delegation set. The claim follows from the
following four properties:
(a) Each of the sets D ∩ [ωh, ω¯`] and D ∩ [ω¯`, ω¯h] is connected or empty.
(b) If both intersections in (a) are non-empty and x1 = max(D ∩ [ωh, ω¯`]) and x2 =
min(D ∩ [ω¯`, ω¯h]), then ω¯` − x1 = x2 − ω¯`.
(c) D ∩ (ω¯h,∞) is empty.
(d) ωh ∈ D.
We prove the properties by contradiction by assuming that each of the properties does
not hold at the optimal delegation set and then constructing a delegation set which is an
improvement.
(a) Suppose first D ∩ [ωh, ω¯`] contains a gap, i.e., there are y1, y2 ∈ D, y1 < y2 so
that D ∩ (y1, y2) = ∅. Then, since y2 < ω¯` < ω¯h, adding the set of actions (y1, y2) would
not affect the agent’s choice (and thus his utility) in the states ω¯` and ω¯h. However, it
would strictly increase the agent’s utility in states ω ∈ (y1, y2). Therefore, by (9), adding
actions from the interval (y1, y2) to D strictly improves the principal’s expected payoff, a
contradiction to the optimality of D. The argument for the case that D∩ [ω¯`, ω¯h] contains
a gap is identical.
(b) Suppose to the contrary that the differences ω¯` − x1 and x2 − ω¯` are not equal.
We only consider the case that ω¯` − x1 < x2 − ω¯` (the other case is analogous). Let
x′1 = 2ω¯` − x1 be the mirror action of x1 mirrored at ω¯`. Then x′1 /∈ Dp. Since x2 ≤ ω¯h
and by construction of x′1, adding the action x
′
1 to the delegation set would not affect the
agent’s choice (and thus his utility) in states the ω¯` and ω¯h. However, it would strictly
increase the agent’s utility the neighborhood of x′1. Therefore, by (9), adding x
′
1 to D
strictly improves the the principal’s expected payoff, a contradiction to the optimality of
D.
(c) Assume to the contrary that D ∩ (ω¯h,∞) is not empty at the optimum. Then
it contains exactly one action, namely x¯ = maxD (other actions would be redundant).
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Let us also denote x′ = maxD \ {x¯}. Then x′ ≤ ω¯h and x¯ is chosen in state ω¯h, i.e.,
1
2
(x′ + x¯) < ω¯h. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose first that the agent chooses action x¯ in state ω¯`, i.e.,
1
2
(x′+ x¯) < ω¯`.
Then it would be profitable to add the action y = x′ + ε for ε small enough. To see
this, observe that y satisfies the non–redundancy condition (8) for p ∈ {h, `}, and also
1
2
(y + x¯) < ω¯p. Thus, it follows by Lemma 2, (i), that adding y improves the principal’s
expected utility, a contradiction to the optimality of D.
Case 2. Suppose next that the agent does not choose action x¯ in state ω¯`, i.e.,
1
2
(x′ + x¯) ≥ ω¯` (i.e., x¯ is redundant for the `-type). We distinguish three subcases.
Case 2.1. If x′ < β0` , then adding the (non–redundant) action y = x
′ + ε (for ε small
enough) to D improves the principal’s expected utility conditional on both types: for
type h strictly due to part (i) of Lemma 2 (since y < x¯ and 1
2
(x′ + x¯) < ω¯h so that also
1
2
(y+ x¯) < ω¯h for ε small enough); for type ` due to part (ii): Here, x
′, which is the action
chosen by type ` in state ω¯`, plays the role of x¯` in the statement of Lemma 2. We can
then apply part (ii) since y > x′ and 1
2
(y+x′) < β0` for ε small enough.) This contradicts
the optimality of D.
Case 2.2. If 1
2
(x¯−x′) < ω¯h−ω¯`, then let y = 2ω¯h−x¯ be the mirror action of x¯, mirrored
at ω¯h. We show that adding y to D improves the principal’s utility conditional on both
types. To see this, note that 1
2
(x′ + x¯) < ω¯h implies that y > x′, and 12(x¯− x′) < ω¯h − ω¯`
implies that 1
2
(x′+y) > ω¯`. Therefore, y is not chosen by the agent in state ω¯` and adding
y does not influence the principal’s utility conditional on type `. In addition, by (9), it
improves the principal’s utility conditional on type h, because it does not affect uh(ω¯h),
but improves the agent’s utility in lower states. This again contradicts the optimality of
D.
Case 2.3. Assume that x′ ≥ β0` and 12(x¯− x′) ≥ ω¯h − ω¯`. We show that removing the
action x¯ improves the principal’s utility. First, removing x¯ has no effect on the principal’s
utility conditional on type `, since x¯ is not chosen in state ω¯` by assumption. Moreover,
the two assumed inequalities imply (recall that β0p = ω¯p − 2b)
x′ + x¯
2
= x′ +
x¯− x′
2
≥ β0` + ω¯h − ω¯` = β0h. (35)
Therefore, removing the action x¯ improves the principal’s utility conditional on type h
due to Lemma 2, (ii). (Observe that if the above inequality holds as an equality, then the
principal is indifferent between removing and not removing x¯. In this case, it is therefore
without loss of generality that property (c) holds.)
(d) Suppose to the contrary that ωh /∈ D. Then D ∩ [ωh, ω¯`] is empty, as otherwise
adding the action ωh would improve the principal’s expected utility conditional on both
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types by Lemma 2, (i). Moreover, by part (c), D cannot contain an action larger than
ω¯h. Therefore, D contains actions in (ω¯`, ω¯h] or in (−∞, ωh). In the former case, similar
arguments as in part (b) imply that the principal’s utility could be improved by adding
the action y = 2ω¯` − (min(D ∩ (ω¯`, ω¯h])). Note that y ∈ [ωh, ω¯`], contradicting the
assumption that D ∩ [ωh, ω¯`] is empty. Moreover, it cannot be optimal to offer actions
only in (−∞, ωh) due to our assumption that b < `/2.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We want to show that the optimal static delegation set is an
interval Dst = [ωh, x¯] with β
0
` ≤ x ≤ β0h. To the contrary, suppose it is not an interval.
By Lemma 12, we then have
Dst = [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪D′, (36)
with D′ = {ω¯` +d}, or D′ = [ω¯` +d, x¯]. Now, D′ = [ω¯` +d, x¯] cannot be optimal, because
the fact that β0h ≤ ω¯` < x¯ implies that lowering x¯ slightly would be an improvement by
Lemma 3 (conditional on both, h and `). Therefore, D′ = {ω¯` + d}. But also this cannot
be (strictly) optimal, because by Lemma 2, (ii), it would be profitable to remove the action
ω¯`+d from D
st conditional on both types (observe that 1
2
(ω¯`−d+ω¯`+d) = ω¯` ≥ β0h ≥ β0` ).
Hence, we have shown that Dst is an interval. We conclude the proof by demonstrating
the stated properties of the upper endpoint βst of the optimal interval. Let Vp(x¯) be the
principal’s expected utility from a general interval [ωh, x¯], conditional on facing type p.
Then, the principal’s expected utility from [ωh, x¯] when he does not know the ex ante
type is
V (x¯) = µhVh(x¯) + µ`V`(x¯). (37)
From the benchmark case with publicly known ability types, we know that the derivative
V ′p(x¯) S 0 ⇔ x¯ T β0p . (38)
Therefore, V ′(x¯) > 0 for all x¯ < β0` , and V
′(x¯) < 0 for all x¯ > β0h. Hence, the optimal
upper endpoint βst is in between β0` and β
0
h.
Moreover, differentiating the first order condition V ′(βst) = 0 with respect to µh yields
d
dµh
βst = V ′h(β
st)− V ′` (βst), (39)
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which is strictly positive by (38) since βst ∈ (β0` , β0h). Furthermore, V converges to Vh
when µh converges to 0. Thus, also β
st converges to β0h. Similarly, β
st converges to β0` as
µ` converges to 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We want to show that the optimal static delegation set, Dst, is
the union of an interval [ωh, ω¯` − d] and a set D′ with either D′ = [ω¯` + d, β0h] and
β0h > ω¯` + d, or D
′ = {ω¯` + d} and β0h ≤ ω¯` + d.
Indeed, suppose, contrary to the claim, that Dst is not of the postulated form. Then
by Lemma 12, it is an interval [ωh, ω¯`− d]. But Lemma 2, (ii), implies that the principal
could improve by offering the set [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪ {ω¯` + d}. (Adding the action ω¯` + d
does not affect the choices of type `. However, since 1
2
(ω¯` − d + ω¯` + d) = ω¯` < β0h by
assumption, Lemma 2, (ii) implies that adding the action ω¯` + d improves the principal’s
utility conditional on type h.) Therefore, by Lemma 12, the optimal set is the union of
two intervals, or an interval and a point.
Consider the first case Dst = [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪ [ω¯` + d, x]. If x 6= β0h, then the principal’s
expected payoff could be improved either by adding an action y = x+ ε close to x (when
x < β0h) or by slightly decreasing x (when x > β
0
h). The modifications would not affect
the choices by type `, but improve the principal’s utility conditional on type h by Lemma
2, (i), in the first case and by Lemma 3 in the second case. This shows that when the
optimal delegation set is the union of two intervals, the second interval is D′ = [ω¯`+d, β0h].
Consider next the case Dst = [ωh, ω¯` − d] ∪ {ω¯` + d}. If ω¯` + d < β0h, then, adding an
action slightly higher than ω¯`+d would improve the principal’s expected payoff conditional
on type h by Lemma 2, (i), but leave the choices of type ` unaffected. This shows that
when the optimal delegation set is the union of an interval and a point ω¯` + d, we have
ω¯` + d ≥ β0h.
Finally, we show that in both cases d < 2b. Otherwise we can add an action y =
ω¯`−d+ε to the delegation set. This improves the principal’s expected utility conditional
on both types: due to Lemma 2, (i) for the h-type, and due to Lemma 2, (ii) for the
`-type (as actions higher than ω¯` are now redundant for the `-type). This completes the
proof.
A.3 Proofs for Section 4
The proof of Lemma 5 makes use of the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 13. Consider an arbitrary menu (Dh, D`) of delegation sets and p ∈ {h, `}.
Assume that there is no z ≥ β0p such that Dp = [ωp, z]. Then for every ε > 0 there
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exists y /∈ Dp such that replacing Dp by the delegation set D˜p = Dp ∪ {y} improves the
principal’s expected utility and improves the agent’s expected utility by no more than ε:
0 < V˜p − Vp, and 0 ≤ U˜p − Up < ε. (40)
Proof of Lemma 13. Adding an action always (weakly) improves the agent’s utility. It is
thus sufficient to specify an action y such that the improvement is marginal and that it
also increases the principal’s expected utility.
Assume first that Dp is not connected. Then Dp contains a gap, i.e., there are y1, y2 ∈
Dp, y1 < y2, such that Dp ∩ (y1, y2) = ∅. Then we can add the action y = y1 + ε′ to Dp
(for ε′ > 0 small). Since y1 is not chosen in state ω¯p, we can find ε′ sufficiently small
so that 1
2
(y + x¯p) < ω¯p. Hence, by Lemma 2, (i), adding y also improves the principal’s
utility.
From now on, let us assume that Dp is connected, i.e., Dp = [xp, x¯p], or Dp is a
singleton (in which case xp = x¯p).
If there is no z ≥ β0p such that Dp = [ωp, z], then we have four possible cases.
Case 1. Let xp < ωp. Because Dp is connected, non-redundancy requires that Dp
is a singleton with xp = x¯p < ωp. Then we can add the action y = xp + ε
′ for ε′ > 0
small enough (so that y < ωp). This modification improves the agent’s utility only
marginally. It also improves the principal’s expected utility due to Lemma 2, (ii), as
1
2
(y + x¯p) < ωp < β
0
p .
Case 2. Let ω¯p < x¯p. Non-redundancy again requires that Dp is a singleton with
xp = x¯p > ω¯p. Then we can add the action y = x¯p − ε′ for ε′ > 0 small enough. This
is again a marginal modification with the modified set D˜p = {y} being a singleton (after
omitting the now redundant point x¯p). In order to compare the principal’s expected
utility we use formula (33) from the proof of Lemma 2, (ii). Now the first bracket is
positive, whereas the second bracket is negative. The third bracket is negative as well,
because ωp + ω¯p − (y + x¯p) < ωp + ω¯p − 2ω¯p < 0 < 2b. Thus, adding y to Dp indeed
improves the principal’s expected utility.
Case 3. Let ωp < xp and x¯p ≤ ω¯p. Now we can add the action y = xp − ε′ for ε′ > 0
small enough (so that y > ωp). This change improves the agent’s utility only marginally
and is profitable for the principal, due to Lemma 2, (i).
Case 4. Let ωp = xp and x¯p < β
0
p . In this case, we can add the action y = x¯p + ε
′
for ε′ > 0 small enough (so that y < β0p). This change again improves the agent’s utility
only marginally, and it improves the principal’s expected utility due to Lemma 2, (ii), as
1
2
(y + x¯p) < β
0
p .
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Proof of Lemma 5. Observe first that at the optimum of the relaxed problem, D∗` =
[ω`, x¯
∗
` ] with x¯
∗
` ≥ β0` . Otherwise, we can consider a modification of D∗` as specified in
Lemma 13. Such a modification preserves (IC`), as it increases U
∗
` , but also improves
V ∗` . This contradicts the optimality of D
∗
` .
Second, we show that (IC`) is binding at the optimum. To the contrary, suppose
(IC`) is slack at the optimum. We derive a contradiction in three steps.
Step 1. We show that D∗h = [ωh, x¯
∗
h], where x¯
∗
h ≥ β0h. Otherwise, consider a modifi-
cation of D∗h as specified in Lemma 13. Such a modification improves the `–type agent’s
expected utility from picking D∗h only marginally and thus preserves the slack (IC`).
Moreover, it also improves V ∗h , which is a contradiction to the optimality of D
∗
h.
Step 2. We show that x¯∗h = β
0
h, i.e., D
∗
h = [ωh, β
0
h] by Step 1. Assume to the contrary
that x¯∗h > β
0
h. Non-redundancy requires that x¯
∗
h ≤ ω¯h. Let us replace the delegation set
D∗h by the set [ωh, x¯
∗
h − ε] where ε > 0 is sufficiently small (so that x¯∗h − ε > β0h). This
modification preserves (IC`), as the `-type’s expected utility is lower when choosing the
modified D∗h. Moreover, by Lemma 3, it improves the principal’s expected utility, which
contradicts the optimality of D∗h.
Step 3. We finally argue that (IC`) cannot be slack. Indeed, as we have already
shown, D∗` is an interval. Since D
∗
h = [ωh, β
0
h], the slack (IC`) implies that x¯
∗
` > β
0
h > β
0
` .
Then, replacing D∗` by [ωh, x¯
∗
` − ε] again preserves the slack (IC`), as the modification
is only marginal. Moreover, by Lemma 3, the principal would benefit from the change,
which is a contradiction to the assumption that D∗` is optimal.
Proof of Lemma 6. We proceed in 5 steps.
Step 1. We start by deriving necessary conditions, (a)–(g), for D∗h in any optimal
delegation menu. Let us denote γ2 = xh(ω¯`) the agent’s choice from D
∗
h in state ω¯` (if in
state ω¯` the agent is indifferent between two actions, let γ2 be the higher one).
(a) x¯∗` ≤ γ2. Otherwise, we have γ2 < x¯∗` ≤ ω¯`. Now note that by the definition of γ2,
any point in D∗h higher than γ2 does not influence the `-type’s utility from choosing the
delegation set D∗h. Thus, in every state ω ∈ (γ2, ω¯`], the agent is strictly better off under
the delegation set D∗` than under D
∗
h, as the former has an action, namely min{ω, x¯∗`},
that is closer to the agent’s ideal action. Moreover, in states ω ∈ [ω`, γ2], the agent
is weakly better off under D∗` , where he chooses his ideal action ω. Thus, the `-type
agent strictly prefers the delegation set D∗` to D
∗
h, which contradicts (IC`) being binding
(Lemma 5).
(b) Each of the intersections D∗h∩(−∞, ω`] and D∗h∩[ω¯`,∞) is connected or empty. If,
to the contrary, one of them is not connected, it contains a gap, i.e., there are y1, y2 ∈ D∗h,
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y1 < y2 such that D
∗
h ∩ (y1, y2) = ∅. Then we can add the action y = y1 + ε to D∗h (for
ε > 0 small). Since y1 is not chosen in state ω¯h, we can find ε sufficiently small so that
1
2
(y + x¯∗h) < ω¯h. Hence, by Lemma 2, (i), adding y also improves the principal’s utility.
Moreover, adding y also preserves (IC`), as it does not modify the agent’s utility in states
[ω`, ω¯`]. This contradicts the optimality of D
∗
h.
(c) x∗h ≤ ωh. Assume the opposite. Then, consider adding the (non-redundant) action
y = 2ωh− x∗h + ε to D∗h.37 For ε > 0 small enough, action y is chosen in state ωh but not
in state ω`. Thus, adding y does not influence the `-type’s utility from the modified D
∗
h,
and so it preserves (IC`). Moreover, this operation improves the principal’s utility from
type h, according to Lemma 2, (i), a contradiction to the optimality of D∗h.
(d) If γ2 < x¯
∗
h, then ω¯` ≤ γ2. Assume the opposite and let us discuss two cases.
First, if 1
2
(x¯∗h − γ2) ≤ ω¯h − ω¯`, consider the action y = 2ω¯` − γ2 (the mirror image of γ2
with respect to ω¯`). Then by definition of γ2 we have y /∈ D∗h and y < x¯∗h (otherwise,
x¯∗h would be chosen in state ω¯`). Moreover, it follows from the assumed inequality that
1
2
(y + x¯∗h) ≤ ω¯h. Thus, adding y to D∗h preserves (IC`) and also improves the principal’s
expected utility by Lemma 2, (i). Second, assume that 1
2
(x¯∗h − γ2) > ω¯h − ω¯`. Observe
that the fact that γ2 is chosen by the agent in the state ω¯`, and x¯
∗
h is chosen in ω¯h implies
that D∗h contains no actions in the interval (γ2, x¯
∗
h). Now we show that removing x¯
∗
h
improves the principal’s expected utility, while not breaking the binding (IC`). Indeed,
removing x¯∗h has no effect on the `-type’s utility from D
∗
h. Moreover, it follows from (a)
and Lemma 5 that γ2 ≥ x¯∗` ≥ β0` . This, together with the inequality 12(x¯∗h−γ2) > ω¯h− ω¯`
yields
γ2 + x¯
∗
h
2
= γ2 +
x¯∗h − γ2
2
≥ β0` + ω¯h − ω¯` = β0h. (41)
Therefore, removing the action x¯∗h improves the principal’s expected utility conditional
on type h due to Lemma 2, (ii). This contradicts the optimality of D∗h.
(e) If γ2 < x¯
∗
h, then x¯
∗
h = β
0
h. Assume the opposite. It follows from (d) that ω¯` ≤ γ2
and from (b) that x¯∗h ≤ ω¯h and D∗h ∩ [ω¯`,∞) = [γ2, x¯∗h]. We show that the principal’s
expected utility can be improved by one of the following modifications. If x¯∗h < β
0
h, we
add the action y = x¯∗h + ε to D
∗
h, where ε > 0 is small enough. If x¯
∗
h > β
0
h, we reduce x¯
∗
h
marginally, i.e., replace D∗h by the delegation set
(
D∗h ∩ (−∞, x¯∗h − ε]
) ∪ {x¯∗h − ε}, where
ε > 0 is small enough. In all cases, because ω¯` ≤ γ2 < x¯∗h, the change does not affect
the agent’s choices in states ω ∈ [ω`, ω¯`] and, thus, it keeps (IC`) binding. Moreover,
it improves the principal’s expected payoff: due to Lemma 2, (ii) for the first change,
and due to Lemma 3 (because x¯∗h − ε > β0h) for the second change. This contradicts the
optimality of D∗h.
(f) If β0h ≤ ω¯`, then γ2 = x¯∗h. This follows directly from (d) and (e).
37Note that 2ωh − x∗h is the mirror action to x∗h, mirrored at ωh.
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(g) If ω¯` < β
0
h, then either β
0
h ≤ γ2 = x¯∗h or ω¯` ≤ γ2 < x¯∗h = β0h. Indeed, on the one
hand, if γ2 = x¯, then β
0
h ≤ γ2. Otherwise, we can add the action y = 2β0h− x¯∗h− ε to D∗h,
where ε > 0 is small enough. This improves the principal’s expected utility by Lemma 2,
(ii), because y > x¯∗h and
1
2
(y + x¯∗h) = β
0
h − 12ε < β0h. On the other hand, if γ2 < x¯∗h, the
statement follows from (d) and (e).
Step 2. We construct a new delegation set D˜h = Dh1∪Dh2; in Step 3 we show that the
principal weakly benefits by replacing D∗h by D˜h. The sets Dh1 and Dh2 are specified in
the following way. First, if γ2 < x¯
∗
h, we infer from (b), (d), and (e) that ω¯` ≤ γ2 < x¯∗h = β0h
and D∗h ∩ [ω¯`,∞) = [γ2, β0h]. In that case, let us set Dh2 = [γ2, β0h]. On the other hand, if
γ2 = x¯
∗
h, we set Dh2 = {γ2}.
Second, we construct the set Dh1 as follows: Type ` would (weakly) prefer the interval
[x∗h, γ2] over D
∗
h and would (weakly) prefer D
∗
h over the two point set {x∗h, γ2}. Hence,
since (IC`) is binding, type ` also weakly prefers [x
∗
h, γ2] over D
∗
` , and D
∗
` over {x∗h, γ2}.
Therefore, an intermediate value argument implies that there is γ1 ∈ [x∗h, γ2] such that
type ` remains indifferent between the set D∗` and the set [x
∗
h, γ1] ∪ {γ2} in between the
large and the small set. (If γ1 = x
∗
h, we identify [x
∗
h, γ1] with {x∗h}.)
The construction ensures that type ` is also indifferent between the setD∗` and [x
∗
h, γ1]∪
Dh2, so replacing D
∗
h by [x
∗
h, γ1]∪Dh2 keeps (IC`) binding. Now it may be that [x∗h, γ1]∪
Dh2 contains redundant actions. If γ1 ≤ ωh then all actions below γ1 are redundant,
and we set Dh1 = {γ1}; if γ1 > ωh, all actions below ωh are redundant, and we set
Dh1 = [ωh, γ1].
Step 3. We now show that the principal’s utility, conditional on facing the h-type, is
weakly higher under D˜h = Dh1 ∪ Dh2 than under D∗h, implying that D˜h is optimal, as
well. For this we use the formula (6) for p = h, where we split the integral into three
parts.
h · Vh = buh(ωh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
∫ ω¯`
ω`
uh(ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
uh(ω) dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
− buh(ω¯h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T5
−hb2. (42)
In what follows we indicate all variables pertaining to D˜h (resp D
∗
h) with a tilde (resp.
an asterisk) and compare the principal’s utilities from D˜h and D
∗
h using (42).
First, observe that T˜3 = T
∗
3 because (IC`) is binding for both D
∗
h and D˜h.
Second, we argue that T˜4 = T
∗
4 and T˜5 = T
∗
5 . Indeed, this follows directly from
the above construction, because we kept the agent’s utility on the states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h]
unchanged.
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Third, we show that T˜1 ≥ T ∗1 and T˜2 ≥ T ∗2 . It follows from (b) and (c) in Step 1 that
D∗h ∩ (−∞, ω`] is either a singleton {x∗h}, or it is an interval of the form [ωh, z]. In both
cases, this intersection is a subset of [x∗h, γ1]. Observe that by construction, the agent’s
utility from D˜h in the range [ωh, ω`] is the same as his utility from the set of actions
[x∗h, γ1]. This implies that T˜1 ≥ T ∗1 and T˜2 ≥ T ∗2 . Summing up, we have shown that the
delegation set D˜h yields at least as large utility to the principal’s as the set D
∗
h.
Step 4. Let us now analyze which forms D˜h can have. If b ≥ 12(ω¯h−ω¯`), or equivalently,
β0h ≤ ω¯`, then it follows from (f) and from construction that Dh2 = {γ2}. Thus, the set
D˜h can only be of the form (i) or (ii), as specified in the lemma.
On the other hand, consider the case b < 1
2
(ω¯h − ω¯`), or equivalently, ω¯` < β0h. First
we show that ωh < γ1. This also implies that D
∗
h is not of the form (i). Assume, to the
contrary, that γ1 ≤ ωh. We show that in such a case, (IC`) cannot be binding. It follows
from (g) that ω¯` ≤ γ2. Observe that for γ1 ≤ ωh and ω¯` ≤ γ2, the `-type’s expected
utility (scaled by `) from delegation set D˜h is increasing in γ1 and decreasing in γ2. Thus,
it can be bounded from above by the expected utility from the delegation set {ωh, ω¯`},
which is ∫ (ωh+ω¯`)/2
ω`
−(ωh − ω)2 dω +
∫ ω¯`
(ωh+ω¯`)/2
−(ω¯` − ω)2 dω < 0 +
∫ 2b
0
−z2 dz. (43)
To see the inequality, note that 1
2
(ωh+ω¯`) = ω¯`− 12(ω¯`−ω`)− 12(ω`−ωh) < ω¯`− 12`− 12(2b) <
ω¯` − 2b, because b < 12(ω¯h − ω¯`) by assumption, and by applying a change of variable to
the second integral. Moreover, as x¯∗` ≥ β0` = ω¯` − 2b, we obtain for the `-type’s expected
utility from choosing D∗` that ` · U∗` ≥
∫ 2b
0
−z2 dz. This together with (43) contradicts
(IC`) being binding and establishes the inequality ωh < γ1.
Second, assume that D˜h is not of the form (ii). Then γ2 < x¯
∗
h and it follows from (g)
that ω¯` ≤ γ2 < x¯∗h = β0h. Moreover, clearly γ1 ≤ ω¯` and we have already shown above
that ωh < γ1. It also follows from (b) that D˜h ∩ [ω¯`,∞) = [γ2, β0h], as specified by the
form (iii).
Step 5. Finally, we complete the proof by deriving the inequalities for γ1, γ2, and
x¯∗` . First, we have already shown (property (a)) that x¯
∗
` ≤ γ2. Second, we show that
γ1 ≤ x¯∗` . Assume the opposite. Then in every state ω ∈ (x¯∗` , ω¯`], the agent is strictly
better off under the delegation set D˜h than under D
∗
` , as the former has an action, namely
min{ω, γ1}, that is closer to the agent’s ideal action. Moreover, in states ω ∈ [ω`, x¯∗` ], the
agent chooses his ideal action ω under both D˜h and D
∗
` . Thus, the `-type agent strictly
prefers the delegation set D˜h, which contradicts (IC`).
Third, we show that 1
2
(x¯∗` + γ2) ≤ ω¯`. The inequality is trivial when γ2 ≤ ω¯`. Let us
thus assume, to the contrary, that γ2 > ω¯` and
1
2
(x¯∗` + γ2) > ω¯`. By definition, in state
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ω¯`, the agent chooses action γ2 from D˜h, whereas he chooses action x¯
∗
` from D
∗
` . Since
x¯∗` ≤ ω¯` < γ2 and 12(x¯∗` + γ2) > ω¯`, the action x¯∗` is strictly better than γ2 in state ω¯`.
Therefore, the agent is strictly better off under the delegation set D∗` than under D˜h in
state ω¯`, and by continuity also in some neighborhood around ω¯`. Moreover, in all other
states in [ω`, ω¯`] the agent is (weakly) better off under D
∗
` than under D˜h since γ1 ≤ x¯∗` .
Thus, the `-type agent strictly prefers the delegation set D∗` to D˜h, which contradicts the
assumption that (IC`) is binding. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let (D∗h, D
∗
` ) be a solution to the relaxed problem. The statement is
trivial when the delegation menu is static. Let us thus consider only delegation menus
that are sequential. Assume, to the contrary, that (ICh) is violated. We show that the
principal can increase her expected utility by offering both types the (static) delegation
menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ) such that D˜h = [ωh, x¯
∗
` ] = [ωh, ω`) ∪D∗` . Under this menu, the h-type is
also offered the `-type’s delegation set which is extended by actions that are never chosen
by the `-type.
Under the menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ), the principal’s expected utility conditional on the `-type
remains unchanged. By (6), the utility conditional on the h-type (scaled by h) changes
by
h(V˜h − V ∗h ) = b[u˜h(ωh)− uh(ωh)]− b[u˜h(ω¯h)− uh(ω¯h)] +
∫ ω¯h
ωh
[u˜h(ω)− uh(ω)] dω, (44)
where u˜h denotes the h-type’s utility under the delegation set D˜h. We argue that the
third term in (44) is positive and the other two are non-negative.
First, observe that u˜h(ωh) = 0 and uh(ωh) ≤ 0. Thus, u˜h(ωh)− uh(ωh) ≥ 0. Second,
−[u˜h(ω¯h) − uh(ω¯h)] = (x¯∗` − ω¯h)2 − (x¯∗h − ω¯h)2, which is non-negative, if and only if
1
2
(x¯∗` + x¯
∗
h) < ω¯h. This clearly holds when x¯
∗
h ≤ ω¯h. On the other hand, when x¯∗h > ω¯h,
then x¯∗h is an isolated point of D
∗
h, and Dh2 as specified in Lemma 6 is a singleton.
However, according to Lemma 6, we have 1
2
(x¯∗` + x¯
∗
h) ≤ ω¯` < ω¯h.
Finally, because (ICh) is violated and D
∗
` ⊆ D˜h, we obtain∫ ω¯h
ωh
uh(ω) dω <
∫ ω¯h
ωh
u`(ω) dω ≤
∫ ω¯h
ωh
u˜h(ω) dω. (45)
Thus, the third term in (44) is indeed positive. This shows that V˜h > V
∗
h , which completes
the proof of the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Let (D∗h, D
∗
` ) be the optimal delegation menu in the form as spec-
ified in Lemmas 5 and 6. Let us assume to the contrary that this menu is a sequential
menu and is (strictly) better for the principal than any static menu. We derive a contra-
diction by showing that the static delegation menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ), where D˜h = [ωh, x¯
∗
` ], weakly
improves the principal’s expected utility.
Now consider the menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ). The principal’s expected utility conditional on
facing the `-type remains unchanged. For the comparison of the principal’s expected
utility conditional on facing the h-type, we use formula (6) and observe that the integral
on the interval [ω`, ω¯`] is actually equal to type `’s expected utility (multiplied by `) from
the delegation sets D∗` and D
∗
h, respectively. These expected utilities are equal due to the
binding (IC`). Moreover, by part (i) and (ii) and the final remark in Lemma 6, the type
h agent chooses action γ2 = x¯
∗
h in the states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h]. Thus,
h · V ∗h = ` · U∗` +
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω −
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
(x¯∗h − ω)2 dω + buh(ωh) + b(x¯∗h − ω¯h)2 − hb2,
h · V˜h = ` · U∗` −
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
(x¯∗` − ω)2 dω + b(x¯∗` − ω¯h)2 − hb2,
h(V˜h − V ∗h ) = bκ(ω¯h)− buh(ωh)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω) dω −
∫ ωh
ω`
uh(ω) dω, (46)
where we define
κ(ω) = (x¯∗` − ω)2 − (x¯∗h − ω)2 = (x¯∗h − x¯∗`)[2ω − (x¯∗` + x¯∗h)]. (47)
In the following, we show that b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯` implies V˜h ≥ V ∗h , which contradicts
sequential delegation being optimal. First recall that by Lemma 6, we have that γ2 = x¯
∗
h.
Hence, by the final remark in Lemma 6, x¯∗` + x¯
∗
h ≤ 2ω¯` < 2ω¯h and thus κ(ω¯h) > 0. We
then obtain
h(V˜h − V ∗h ) ≥ bκ(ω¯h)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω) dω ≥ bκ(ω¯h)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω¯h) dω
= [b− (ω¯h − ω¯`)]κ(ω¯h) ≥ 0. (48)
The first inequality was obtained by neglecting the non-negative terms − ∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω
and −buh(ωh). The second inequality follows from the fact that κ(ω) is increasing in ω.
The third inequality follows from the assumption b ≥ ω¯h − ω¯` and from κ(ω¯h) > 0. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We begin with part (ii): We show that the marginal sequential
delegation menu (14) is strictly better than static delegation whenever b < bˆ and µh <
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µˆh(b), where µˆh(b) is determined below. As argued in the text following the statement of
the proposition, this is the case if expression (15) satisfies:
dV˜h(ε)
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
> 0 ⇔ b < bˆ and µh < µˆh(b). (49)
Indeed, we have
h
dV˜h(ε)
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
=
d
dε
{∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
−(βst + ε− ω)2 dω − b[−(βst + ε− ω¯h)2]
}∣∣∣∣
ε=0
. (50)
= −2
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
(βst − ω) dω + 2b(βst − ω¯h)
= −(βst − ω¯h)2 + (βst − ω¯`)2 + 2b(βst − ω¯h)
= [2βst − 2ω¯h + (ω¯h − ω¯`)] [−(ω¯h − ω¯`)]− 2b(ω¯h − βst)
= 2(ω¯h − βst)(ω¯h − ω¯` − b)− (ω¯h − ω¯`)2. (51)
Hence, since ω¯h − ω¯` − b > 0 by assumption, we obtain
dV˜h(ε)
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
> 0 ⇔ βst < ω¯h − (ω¯h − ω¯`)
2
2(ω¯h − ω¯` − b) ≡ ξh. (52)
Now, a computation (provided below) shows that
β0` < ξh ⇔ b < bˆ. (53)
By Proposition 1, βst increases monotonically from β0` to β
0
h as µh goes from 0 to 1. Thus,
for every b < bˆ there is a unique µˆh(b) ∈ (0, 1] so that βst < ξh if and only if µh < µˆh(b).
Together with (52) and (53), this establishes (49).
To complete the proof of part (ii), we show (53). Let a = ω¯h − ω¯`. Observe that
a− b > 0 by assumption. Recall that β0` = ω¯` − 2b. Thus, by definition of ξh:
β0` < ξh ⇔ −2b < a−
a2
2(a− b) ⇔ 4b
2 − 2ab− a2 < 0
⇔ b > 1
4
(1−
√
5)a and b < 1
4
(1 +
√
5)a = bˆ. (54)
The left inequality in the last line is always satisfied since 1
2
a > 1
4
(1−√5)a and since, by
the maintained assumption in this subsection, b ≥ 1
2
a. Therefore, β0` < ξh if and only if
b < bˆ, as desired.
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Proof of part (i): By Lemma 5 and 6, the optimal delegation menu is in the set
R ≡ {(Dh, D`) | Dh = [min{ωh, zh}, zh] ∪ {x¯h}, D` = [ω`, x¯`], (55)
β0` ≤ x¯` ≤ x¯h, 12(x¯` + x¯h) ≤ ω¯`,
(IC`) binding
}
Due to the fact that (IC`) is binding, any menu in R is pinned down by the points x¯h
and x¯`, and we denote the associated expected utility for the principal by
V (x¯h, x¯`). (56)
Observe that static interval delegation corresponds to the menu in R for which x¯h = x¯`.
By (6) and (13), and using the fact that (IC`) is binding, we obtain
V (x¯h, x¯`) =
µh
h
hVh +
µ`
`
`V`
=
µh
h
[
` · U` +
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω) dω +
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
uh(ω) dω + buh(ωh)− buh(ω¯h)
]
+
µ`
`
[` · U` + bu`(ω`)− bu`(ω¯`)] . (57)
Since uh(ω) ≤ 0 for all ω, the second and the fourth term in the first square brackets are
non-positive, and we obtain that
Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≡ µh
h
[
` · U` +
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
uh(ω) dω − buh(ω¯h)
]
+
µ`
`
[` · U` + bu`(ω`)− bu`(ω¯`)] (58)
is an upper bound on V which is actually attained if ω` ≤ x¯h = x¯`, i.e.:
V (x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) for all x¯` ≤ x¯h, and V (x, x) = Ψ(x, x) for ω` ≤ x. (59)
We will show that Ψ is maximized at the point (βst, βst). Since Ψ is an upper bound on
V that coincides with V for x¯h = x¯`, this will imply that also V is maximized at the point
(βst, βst) so that static delegation is optimal. We begin by computing Ψ explicitly. As
argued in the proof of Lemma 6, for all ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯h], we have xh(ω) = x¯h ≤ ω¯h. Recall,
moreover, that ` · U` =
∫ ω¯`
ω`
u`(ω)dω. This, together with the fact that D` = [ω`, x¯`] is an
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interval, implies that
Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) =
µh
h
[
−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
(x¯h − ω)2 dω + b(x¯h − ω¯h)2
]
−
(µh
h
+
µ`
`
)∫ ω¯`
x¯`
(x¯` − ω)2 dω + µ`
`
b(x¯` − ω¯`)2 − b2. (60)
We will be interested in the partial derivative of Ψ. Observe that the partial derivative
of Ψ with respect to x¯h is the same as (a multiple of) the derivative of hVh with respect
to βst in (50). Thus, we can deduce as above:
∂Ψ(x¯h, x¯`)
∂x¯h
> 0 ⇔ x¯h < ξh. (61)
With these preliminaries, we can now prove the claim.
We consider first the case b ≥ bˆ. To show the optimality of static delegation, we show
that when choosing a delegation menu (Dh, D`) in R, it is optimal to choose x¯` = x¯h,
that is, V (x¯h, x¯`) ≤ V (x¯`, x¯`) for all x¯` ≤ x¯h. Since V (x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) and V (x¯`, x¯`) =
Ψ(x¯`, x¯`), it is sufficient to show that
Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯`, x¯`) for all x¯` ≤ x¯h. (62)
Indeed, from expression (53), ξh ≤ β0` if and only if b ≥ bˆ. Therefore, b ≥ bˆ together with
(61) and the fact that β0` ≤ x¯` implies that
∂Ψ(x¯h, x¯`)
∂x¯h
≤ 0 for all x¯` ≤ x¯h. (63)
We can deduce that Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯`, x¯`), establishing (62) as desired.
Next, we show that static delegation is optimal if b < bˆ and µh ≥ µˆh(b). Because
for all x¯` ≤ x¯h, we have V (x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯h, x¯`), it is sufficient for the optimality of static
delegation that
Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(βst, βst) = V (βst, βst) for all x¯` ≤ x¯h. (64)
We distinguish three cases. Suppose first that x¯` ≥ ξh. Then equation (61) yields
that ∂Ψ/∂x¯h ≤ 0 for all x¯h ≥ x¯`. Thus, Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯`, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(βst, βst).
Second, suppose that x¯h > ξh > x¯`. Then equation (61) yields that ∂Ψ/∂x¯h ≤ 0 for
all x¯h ≥ ξh. Thus, Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(ξh, x¯`). Thus, it cannot be true that x¯h > ξh at the
optimum.
Third, suppose that x¯h ≤ ξh. By definition, µh ≥ µˆh(b) implies that ξh ≤ βst.
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Accordingly,
x¯` ≤ x¯h ≤ βst, (65)
and, by (61),
∂Ψ(βst, βst)
∂x¯h
≤ 0. (66)
Since βst satisfies the first order condition for optimal interval delegation, we also have
0 =
dV (x¯, x¯)
dx¯
∣∣∣
x¯=βst
=
dΨ(x¯, x¯)
dx¯
∣∣∣
x¯=βst
=
∂Ψ(βst, βst)
∂x¯h
+
∂Ψ(βst, βst)
∂x¯`
. (67)
The two previous properties imply
∂Ψ(βst, βst)
∂x¯`
≥ 0. (68)
Now, by definition of Ψ, we can compute
∂Ψ(x¯h, x¯`)
∂x¯`
= −
(µh
h
+
µ`
`
)
· 2 ·
∫ ω¯`
x¯`
(x¯` − ω) dω + µ`
`
2b(x¯` − ω¯`)
=
(µh
h
+
µ`
`
)
(x¯` − ω¯`)2 − µ`
`
2b(ω¯` − x¯`)
= (ω¯` − x¯`)
[(µh
h
+
µ`
`
)
(ω¯` − x¯`)− µ`
`
2b
]
. (69)
Note that this expression does not depend on x¯h. Now, since β
st ≤ ω¯`, (68) implies
that the square bracket in the last line is non-negative when evaluated at x¯` = β
st. It
follows that the square bracket in the last line is a fortiori non-negative when evaluated
at x¯` ≤ βst. Thus, we get
∂Ψ(x¯h, x¯`)
∂x¯`
≥ 0 for all x¯` ≤ x¯h. (70)
Hence, Ψ(x¯h, x¯`) ≤ Ψ(x¯h, x¯h) ≤ Ψ(βst, βst). This establishes (64) and completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We only consider the case where the optimal static delegation set
is the union of an interval plus a point. (The argument for the other case is identical.)
Let D˜` = [ω`, ω¯` − d], and consider the marginal modification defined in (19),
D˜h(ε) = [ωh, ω¯` − d− η] ∪ [ω¯` + d− ε, ω¯` + d], η, ε > 0, (71)
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so that (IC`) is binding. Observe that for ε = 0, the delegation menu (D˜h(0), D˜`)
essentially reduces to the optimal static menu. We now show that the derivative of the
principal’s utility with respect to ε is strictly positive when evaluated at ε = 0. Indeed,
conditional on facing the `-type, the principal’s utility does not depend on ε. Moreover,
conditional on facing the h-type, the principal’s utility is given by (17). For ε small
enough, ω¯` − d − η is larger than ω`, because by Proposition 2, d < 2b, and so together
with Assumption A1, we have ω¯` − d > ω¯` − 2b ≥ ω¯` − ` = ω`. Because (IC`) is binding
and because the `-type is indifferent between D˜` and D˜h(0), it must be that the action
ω¯` + d− ε is closer to ω¯` than is the action ω¯` − d− η. Hence, the agent chooses action
ω¯` + d − ε in states ω ∈ [ω¯`, ω¯` + d − ε]. Because of this and since, by Proposition 2,
ω¯` + d < ω¯` + 2b ≤ ω¯` + (ω¯h − ω¯`) = ω¯h, (17) writes
h · V˜h(ε) = ` · U∗` −
∫ ω¯`+d−ε
ω¯`
(ω¯` + d− ε− ω)2 dω −
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`+d
(ω¯` + d− ω)2 dω
+ b(ω¯` + d− ωh)2 − hb2. (72)
The derivative with respect to ε is
h
dV˜h(ε)
dε
= 2
∫ ω¯`+d−ε
ω¯`
(ω¯` + d− ε− ω) dω = (ω¯` + d− ε− ω¯`)2, (73)
which is strictly positive for ε = 0. This establishes the claim.
A.4 Proofs for Section 8
Proof of Lemma 8. The proof proceeds in 6 steps.
Step 1. First we show that equation (22) has indeed a unique solution in (ωp, ω¯p). It
will be more convenient to work directly with the original density f . Using the transfor-
mation ω′ = φ+ (ω − φ)/p we obtain∫ ω¯p
β
[1− Fp(ω)− bfp(ω)] dω =
∫ 1
φ+(β−φ)/p
[p(1− F (ω′))− bf(ω′)] dω′. (74)
Now define
Γ(z, p) =
∫ 1
z
[
1− F (ω)− b
p
f(ω)
]
dω. (75)
Then (74) becomes equal to pΓ(φ+ (β− φ)/p, p). Given p ∈ (b/φ, 1], we are now looking
for z ∈ (0, 1) that solves the equation Γ(z, p) = 0. Then β = φ + p(z − φ) solves the
original equation.
First note that z = 1 is a trivial solution to the equation, which we exclude as it
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does not belong to (0, 1). To see the existence of a solution z ∈ (0, 1), observe that
1− F (ω)− b/p · f(ω) is negative for ω close to 1, as f is non–decreasing by Assumption
A2. Thus, Γ(z, p) is negative for z close to 1. Now consider z = 0 and recall the general
formula
∫ 1
0
[1− F (ω)] dω = φ.38 Then we obtain Γ(0, p) = φ− b/p, which is positive due
to A1. Continuity then implies the existence of a solution.
The see the uniqueness of the solution, observe that Γ is strictly concave in z, as F
is increasing and f is non-decreasing due to A2. Thus, it can attain the value zero in at
most two points, while z = 1 already is one of them. Thus, there can be only one solution
in the interval (0, 1). Let zˆ(p) denote that solution. As indicated above, then
β0p = φ+ p[zˆ(p)− φ]. (76)
Also note that as 1− F (ω)− b/p · f(ω) is decreasing, then 1− F (z)− b/p · f(z) > 0 for
z = zˆ(p).
Step 2. Now we prove that β0p is increasing in p (assuming that b < pφ). Using the
Implicit function theorem we obtain (for simplicity we write zˆ instead of zˆ(p))
dzˆ(p)
dp
= −∂Γ
∂p
/∂Γ
∂z
=
b
p2
· 1− F (zˆ)
1− F (zˆ)− b/p · f(zˆ) . (77)
Then
dβ0p
dp
= (zˆ − φ) + p · dzˆ(p)
dp
= (zˆ − φ) + b
p
· 1− F (zˆ)
1− F (zˆ)− b/p · f(zˆ) . (78)
Now, as zˆ > 0 we obtain
φ− zˆ = −zˆ +
∫ 1
0
[1− F (ω)] dω = −zˆ +
∫ zˆ
0
[1− F (ω)] dω +
∫ 1
zˆ
[1− F (ω)] dω
<
∫ 1
zˆ
[1− F (ω)] dω = b
p
[1− F (zˆ)], (79)
where the last equality holds, as zˆ solves the equation Γ(zˆ, p) = 0. Combining (78) and
(79) we obtain
dβ0p
dp
>
b
p
[1− F (zˆ)]
[
−1 + 1
1− F (zˆ)− b/p · f(zˆ)
]
. (80)
This is positive, as 1 − F (zˆ) − b/p · f(zˆ) > 0, which we have established at the end of
Step 1.
Step 3. We show that ω¯p − β0p is non-decreasing in p. For this recall that ω¯p =
38This follows directly from the definition of the mean and integration by parts.
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φ+ p(1− φ) and thus ω¯p − β0p = p(1− zˆ(p)). Then
d(ω¯p − β0p)
dp
= (1− zˆ)− p · dzˆ(p)
dp
= (1− zˆ)− b
p
· 1− F (zˆ)
1− F (zˆ)− b/p · f(zˆ) . (81)
Now let us denote Φ(z) =
∫ 1
z
[1− F (ω)] dω. By definition of zˆ, we have b/p = Φ(zˆ)/[1−
F (zˆ)]. Substituting this into the above equality yields
d(ω¯p − β0p)
dp
= Φ1(zˆ), where Φ1(z) ≡ (1− z)− Φ(z)
1− F (z) ·
1
1− Φ(z)
1−F (z) · f(z)1−F (z)
. (82)
We will argue that Φ1(z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1). Let us consider first z → 1− (i.e., z
converging to 1 from below). Then Φ1(z) → 0, since, using L’Hospital’s rule, we have
Φ(z)/[1− F (z)] → 0 and Φ(z)f(z)/[1− F (z)]2 → 1
2
. Now we show that Φ′1(z) ≤ 0. For
this observe that Φ′(z) = −[1− F (z)] and
d
dz
Φ(z)
1− F (z) = −1 +
Φ(z)
1− F (z) ·
f(z)
1− F (z) . (83)
Hence,
Φ′1(z) = −1−
d
dz
[ Φ(z)
1− F (z)
]
· 1
1− Φ(z)
1−F (z) · f(z)1−F (z)
+
Φ(z)
1− F (z) ·
1[
1− Φ(z)
1−F (z) · f(z)1−F (z)
]2 · ddz [ Φ(z)1− F (z) · f(z)1− F (z)]
=
Φ(z)
1− F (z) ·
1[
1− Φ(z)
1−F (z) · f(z)1−F (z)
]2 · ddz [ Φ(z)1− F (z) · f(z)1− F (z)]. (84)
Now recall that due to Assumption A4, the right-hand side of (83) is non-decreasing
and has thus a non-negative derivative. Thus, Φ′1(z) ≥ 0, and this shows that indeed
Φ1(z) ≥ 0, and thus ω¯p − β0p is non-decreasing in p.
Step 4. It remains to show that with β0p defined as in the lemma, the optimal delegation
set is [ωp, β
0
p ]. This follows from the same argument that we provide in the discussion
below Lemma 4 for the uniform distribution. For this argument we need to adapt the
proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3. We do this in the remaining 3 steps.
Step 5. Let us reconsider the proof of Lemma 2. The proof is almost the same as the
original proof for the uniform distribution. For the sake of brevity we don’t repeat the
whole proof, but rather only focus on parts that are different.
Step 5.1. Consider statement (ii), first case. Now we use decomposition (21) and
obtain formulas similar to (26), (27), and (28) but with appropriate weights on the
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utilities. Consequently, formula (31) becomes
V˜p − Vp = (y − x¯p) · 2
∫ ω¯p
(y+x¯p)/2
[1− Fp(ω)− bfp(ω)] dω. (31’)
This is again positive, as 1
2
(y + x¯p) < β
0
p by assumption.
Step 5.2. Consider statement (ii), third case. Similarly as above, formula (33) becomes
V˜p − Vp = (y − x¯p)[2φ− (y + x¯p)− 2b]. (33’)
This is positive, as 2φ− (y + x¯p) ≥ 2φ− 2ωp = 2pφ > 2b by Assumption A1.
Step 6. Let us now reconsider Lemma 3. The lemma holds in the original form
and, using now steps 1–5, its proof is identical to the original proof for the uniform
distribution.
Proof of Lemma 9. This lemma generalizes Proposition 1. For the proof we proceed in 2
steps. We first adapt the proof of Lemma 12 and then the proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. Let us reconsider Lemma 12. Its proof is almost the same as the original
proof for the uniform distribution. We again don’t repeat the whole proof, but rather
only focus on parts that are different.
In statement (c), Case 2.3, formula (35) now becomes
x′ + x¯
2
= x′ +
x¯− x′
2
≥ β0` + ω¯h − ω¯` ≥ β0h. (35’)
For the uniform distribution, the last inequality is an equality, which obviously holds as
ω¯p − β0p = 2b. Here, we have an inequality instead, due to Lemma 8.
Step 2. Let us consider Proposition 1. Its proof is identical to the original proof. We
would only like to point out that in the statement and on several occasions in the proof
we use the inequality β0` < β
0
h. This we have now established in Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 10. In the proof we follow the structure of arguments in Section 7. We
proceed in 5 steps.
Step 1. Let us first consider Lemma 5. This lemma holds in the original form. Its
proof is also identical to the proof for the uniform distribution.
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Step 2. Now we reconsider the auxiliary Lemma 13 that we use in the proof of
Lemma 5. Lemma 13 still holds and its proof is almost the same as the original proof. It
differs only in Case 2 where we refer directly to the formula (33). Instead of (33) we use
the generalized formula (33’) established in Step 5.1 in the proof of Lemma 8. Now, the
first bracket is negative. The second bracket is negative as well, because 2φ− (y + x¯p) <
2φ− 2ω¯p < 0 < 2b. Summing up, we again obtain that V˜p > Vp.
Step 3. We state an additional auxiliary lemma proven below. This lemma will
replace the argument that due to (IC`) binding we could simply substitute ` ·U∗` into the
principal’s expected utility when dealing with the uniform distribution.
Lemma 14. Let g1, g2, λ : [a, b] → R be integrable functions such that g1, g2 > 0 and
g2(ω)/g1(ω) is non-increasing in ω. Moreover, assume there is x ∈ [a, b] such that λ(ω) ≥
0 for ω ∈ [a, x) and λ(ω) ≤ 0 for ω ∈ (x, b]. Then the following statements hold:
(i) If
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g1(ω) dω ≥ 0, then
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g2(ω) dω ≥ 0.
(ii) If
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g1(ω) dω > 0, then
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g2(ω) dω > 0.
Step 4. Now we establish the generalization of Lemma 6. Note that case (iii) where
Dh2 = [γ2, β
0
h] does not occur here, as Assumption A3 implies that β
0
h < ω¯`.
Consider a delegation menu (D∗h, D
∗
` ) where D
∗
` is an interval and (IC`) is binding.
We use the same construction as in the discussion following Lemma 6: Replace D∗h by the
set D˜h = [x
∗
h, γ1]∪{x¯∗h} so that (IC`) is maintained. The proof is identical to the original
proof up to one point. In particular, we still obtain an analogue decomposition as in
(42), with appropriate weights. However, the difference is that now the equality T˜3 = T
∗
3
does not need to hold. Instead, we now argue that Lemma 14 implies that T˜3 ≥ T ∗3
when Assumption A5 is satisfied, i.e., when [fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)]/f`(ω) is non-increasing in
ω. To see this, let u˜h be the agent’s utility under D˜h and let us set g1(ω) = f`(ω),
g2(ω) = fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω), and λ(ω) = u˜h(ω)− uh(ω).
By construction, there is a x ∈ (ω`, ω¯`) such that u˜h(ω) − uh(ω) ≥ 0 for ω ∈ [ω`, x)
and u˜h(ω)− uh(ω) ≤ 0 for ω ∈ (x, ω¯`].39 Because (IC`) is maintained, we have∫ ω¯`
ω`
[u˜h(ω)− uh(ω)]f`(ω) dω = 0. (85)
39To see this assume that D˜h 6= D∗h. As the `-type is indifferent between those two sets it cannot be
that D∗h∩(γ1, x¯∗h) is empty; let y be the smallest action in that intersection. We argue that x = 12 (γ1 +y)
has the desirable property. First, if ω ≤ γ1, then under D˜h the agent chooses his ideal action, and thus,
u˜h(ω) = 0 ≥ uh(ω). If γ1 < ω < x, then the agent is better off when choosing action γ1 ∈ D˜h than by
choosing any action from D∗h. Therefore, u˜h(ω) ≥ uh(ω). Finally, if ω > x, then the agent prefers action
y to γ1. Thus, he is better off under D
∗
h than under D˜h, and so u˜h(ω) ≤ uh(ω).
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By the decomposition (21), the difference in the principal’s expected payoff after the
modification corresponds now to
T˜3 − T ∗3 =
∫ ω¯`
ω`
[u˜h(ω)− uh(ω)] [fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω. (86)
Lemma 14 and (85) imply that (86) is non-negative if (23) holds. The remainder of the
proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.
Step 5. Finally, let us prove a generalization of Lemma 7 and show that the solution
of the relaxed problem (of the form established above) also solves the original problem.
Similarly, as in the original proof, let us assume that (ICh) is violated. We again show
that in such a case, the principal’s expected utility can be improved by offering the static
delegation menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ) where D˜h = [ωh, x¯
∗
` ]. Under this menu, the principal’s expected
utility conditional on the `-type remains unchanged. Similarly, to (44), by decomposition
(21) the utility conditional on the h-type changes by
V˜h − V ∗h = b[u˜h(ωh)− uh(ωh)]fh(ωh)− b[u˜h(ω¯h)− uh(ω¯h)]fh(ω¯h)
+
∫ ω¯h
ωh
[u˜h(ω)− uh(ω)] [fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω. (87)
The first and the second term are non-negative by the same argument as in the original
proof. It remains to show that the integral in (87) is positive. By construction, there is
an x ∈ [ωh, ω¯h] such that u˜h(ω)−uh(ω) ≥ 0 for ω ∈ [ωh, x) and u˜h(ω)−uh(ω) ≤ 0 for ω ∈
(x, ω¯h].
40 Now we apply Lemma 14, where we set g1(ω) = fh(ω), g2(ω) = fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω),
and λ(ω) = u˜h(ω)− uh(ω). Then g1(ω) > 0 and g2(ω) > 0 for ω ∈ (ωh, ω¯h) and it follows
from (23) that g2/g1 is non-increasing. Moreover, similarly to (45), we have∫ ω¯h
ωh
uh(ω)fh(ω) dω <
∫ ω¯h
ωh
u`(ω)fh(ω) dω ≤
∫ ω¯h
ωh
u˜h(ω)fh(ω) dω, (88)
where the first inequality follows from the violated (ICh) and the second from the fact
that D∗` ⊆ D˜h. It follows then from Lemma 14 that the last term in (87) is positive.
This shows that V˜h > V
∗
h , which contradicts the optimality of (D
∗
h, D
∗
` ) and completes
the proof of the lemma.
40The precise argument here is similar to the argument given in footnote 39. For Dh of the form as
specified in Lemma 6 (see Step 4 of this proof), we now set x = 12 (x¯
∗
` + x¯
∗
h).
55
Proof of Lemma 14. We have∫ b
a
λ(ω)g2(ω) dω =
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g1(ω)
g2(ω)
g1(ω)
dω
=
∫ x
a
λ(ω)g1(ω)
g2(ω)
g1(ω)
dω +
∫ b
x
λ(ω)g1(ω)
g2(ω)
g1(ω)
dω
≥
∫ x
a
λ(ω)g1(ω)
g2(x)
g1(x)
dω +
∫ b
x
λ(ω)g1(ω)
g2(x)
g1(x)
dω
=
g2(x)
g1(x)
∫ b
a
λ(ω)g1(ω) dω. (89)
To appreciate the inequality in the third line, recall that g1 > 0 and that g2/g1 is non-
increasing. Thus,
λ(ω)g1(ω) ≥ 0 and g2(ω)
g1(ω)
≥ g2(x)
g1(x)
for ω ∈ [a, x),
λ(ω)g1(ω) ≤ 0 and g2(ω)
g1(ω)
≤ g2(x)
g1(x)
for ω ∈ (x, b],
which implies the inequality in (89). Finally, as g2(x)/g1(x) > 0, both claims in the
lemma follow directly from (89).
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. We again show
that if, on the contrary, sequential delegation is optimal, then the principal can improve
her expected payoff by offering the static delegation menu (D˜h, D
∗
` ), where D˜h = [ωh, x¯
∗
` ].
Considering κ(ω) defined as in (47), formula (46) needs now to be adjusted by using
the proper weights:
V˜h − V ∗h = bκ(ω¯h)fh(ω¯h)− buh(ωh)fh(ωh)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω)[fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)] dω
−
∫ ω`
ωh
uh(ω)[fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)] dω
+
∫ ω¯`
ω`
[u˜h(ω)− uh(ω)] [fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω. (90)
The second and the fourth term are clearly non-negative. Moreover, the fifth term is
non-negative, which follows from the binding (IC`) and Lemma 14 (stated in Step 3
in the proof of Lemma 9), where we set g1(ω) = f`(ω), g2(ω) = fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω), and
λ(ω) = u˜h(ω) − uh(ω). We clearly have g1 > 0, g2 > 0 and by construction there is an
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x ∈ [ω`, ω¯`] such that λ(ω) ≥ 0 for ω ∈ [ω`, x) and λ(ω) ≤ 0 for ω ∈ (x, ω¯`]. Thus,
V˜h − V ∗h ≥ bκ(ω¯h)fh(ω¯h)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω)[fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)] dω
≥ bκ(ω¯h)fh(ω¯h)−
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
κ(ω¯h)[fh(ω) + bf
′
h(ω)] dω
= κ(ω¯h)[1− Fh(ω¯`)− bfh(ω¯`)] ≥ 0. (91)
In the second inequality we used the fact that κ(ω) is increasing. The last inequality
follows from the assumption 1 − Fh(ω¯`) − bfh(ω¯`) > 0 and from κ(ω¯h) > 0, which holds
by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3. This contradict the optimality of
sequential delegation and completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider the static delegation set D = [ωh, β] and let D˜h = [ωh, z]∪
{x}, where z < β < x, be the h-type’s delegation set that keeps the `-type indifferent
between D and D˜h.
41 We consider x as independent variable and let z(x) be such that
the `-type remains indifferent. For x sufficiently close to β such z(x) clearly exists, is
unique, and is also close to β.
Then the `-type’s expected utility from the delegation set D˜h is
U˜` = −
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)2f`(ω) dω −
∫ ω¯`
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)2f`(ω) dω. (92)
In order to keep the `-type indifferent, its derivative with respect to x needs to be equal
to 0. (Here we make use of the Implicit function theorem.) Thus,
0 =
dU˜`
dx
= −z′(x) · 2
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)f`(ω) dω − 2
∫ ω¯`
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)f`(ω) dω. (93)
Now consider the principal’s expected utility from D˜h, using the decomposition (21):
V˜h = −
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)2[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω
−
∫ ω¯h
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)2[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω + b(x− ω¯h)2fh(ω¯h)− b2. (94)
41Compared to the notation in Section 7.2, it is now more convenient to use x = β + ε and z = β − η.
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Taking the derivative with respect to x, we obtain
dV˜h
dx
= −z′(x) · 2
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω
− 2
∫ ω¯h
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω + 2b(x− ω¯h)fh(ω¯h). (95)
Substituting for z′(x) from (93), we obtain
dV˜h
dx
=
2
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω
2
∫ (z+x)/2
z
(z − ω)f`(ω) dω
· 2
∫ ω¯`
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)f`(ω) dω
− 2
∫ ω¯h
(z+x)/2
(x− ω)[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω + 2b(x− ω¯h)fh(ω¯h). (96)
Now, when x → β, then z(x) → β as well. Thus, in the fraction, both the numerator
and the denominator converge to zero. In order to evaluate the limit, we use L’Hospital’s
rule twice. Most of the terms then converge to zero and we obtain that the limit is equal
to [fh(β) + bf
′
h(β)]/f`(β). Thus,
dV˜h
dx
∣∣∣
x→β
=
fh(β) + bf
′
h(β)
f`(β)
· 2
∫ ω¯`
β
(β − ω)f`(ω) dω
− 2
∫ ω¯h
β
(β − ω)[fh(ω) + bf ′h(ω)] dω + 2b(β − ω¯h)fh(ω¯h) (97)
= −fh(β) + bf
′
h(β)
f`(β)
· 2
∫ ω¯`
β
[1− F`(ω)] dω
+ 2
∫ ω¯h
β
[1− Fh(ω)− bfh(ω)] dω, (98)
where the second equality was obtained using integration by parts. Now the last ex-
pression is equal to ∆Vh from the Lemma, which implies the conditions for marginal
sequential delegation to be profitable.42
Proof of Proposition 7. The fact that A1 and A3 are satisfied for b0 can be equivalently
stated as ∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
[1− Fh(ω)] dω
1− Fh(ω¯`) < b0 < `φ. (99)
Let us now denote
b =
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
[1− Fh(ω)] dω
1− Fh(ω¯`) , and b1 =
1− Fh(ω¯`)
fh(ω¯`)
. (100)
42For uniform distribution, ∆Vh simplifies to (51).
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Then we have b < b1.
43 Now consider b ∈ (b, min{b0, b1}). Then b satisfies A1 and A3,
and, due to Lemma 9, the optimal static delegation set is an interval.
By definition of b and (22), we obtain in the special case for b = b that β0h = ω¯`. Then
for β converging to β0h = ω¯` from below we have ∆Vh → 0, where the second integral in
∆Vh vanishes by definition of β
0
h in (22). Moreover, it follows from a calculation that
d∆Vh
dβ
∣∣∣
β=ω¯`
= −2[1− Fh(ω¯`)− bfh(ω¯`)], (101)
which is negative for b < b1. This means that ∆Vh > 0 for some β < ω¯` and b > b such
that b is close to b and β is close to ω¯`. Consequently, ∆Vh > 0 when b > b is close to b
and µh is close to 1 (as then β
st is close to β0h which is close to ω¯`).
Example satisfying Assumptions A1–A5. Let us provide an example of a distribution and
parameters that satisfy all assumptions. Consider the linear density f(ω) = 2ω discussed
in footnote 36. Then F (ω) = ω2 and φ = 2
3
. Assumption A2 is clearly satisfied. As-
sumption A1 becomes b < 2
3
`, while Assumption A3 can be rewritten as 1
9
(h − `)(8h +
`)/(5h+`) < b. These two inequalities are consistent when 8−37(`/h)−7(`/h)2 < 0, i.e.,
`/h > 37+3
√
177
16
≈ 0.208. Now, the expression in Assumption A4 becomes 1
3
[−z+2/(1+z)],
which is clearly convex. Finally, Assumption A5 holds as well, as f is log-concave and
fh(ω)/f`(ω) = `
2/h2 ·(2h+3ω−2)/(2`+3ω−2) is decreasing for all ω > 2
3
(1−`) = ω`.
43To see this, observe that
∫ ω¯h
ω¯`
[1 − Fh(ω)] dω/[1 − Fh(ω¯`)] < ω¯h − ω¯` < [1 − Fh(ω¯`)]/fh(ω¯`), which
follows from the monotonicity of fh and Fh.
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